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Introduction  
 
This thesis is about the relation between knowledge and literature in The Order of Things 
written by Michel Foucault. This book, in which Foucault explores the conditions of 
possibility of systems of knowledge, ‘arose out of a passage of Borges’, as Foucault states in 
the preface (xvi). Why did The Order of Things arise out of a passage of Jorge Luis Borges, 
an Argentine writer? This passage, which Foucault quotes in its entirety, is from Borges’ text 
“The Analytical Language of John Wilkins”, in which Borges cites ‘a certain Chinese 
encyclopedia’ in which is written that:  
 
Animals are divided into (a) those that belong to the emperor; (b) embalmed 
ones; (c) those that are trained; (d) suckling pigs; (e) mermaids; (f) fabulous 
ones; (g) stray dogs; (h) those that are included in this classification; (i) those 
that tremble as if they were mad; (j) innumerable ones; (k) those drawn with a 
very fine camel’s-hair brush; (l) etcetera; (m) those that have just broken the 
flower vase; (n) those that at a distance resemble flies.  
(Borges Selected Non-Fictions 231) 
 
The question that Foucault asks with regard to Borges’ classification is: ‘What is the ground 
on which we are able to establish the validity of this classification with complete certainty?’ 
(xxi).  
Foucault states that the aim of The Order of Things, which arose out of this passage of 
Borges, is to ‘rediscover on what basis knowledge and theory become possible; within what 
space of order knowledge was constituted; on the basis of what historical a priori, and in the 
element of what positivity, ideas could appear, sciences be established, experience be 
reflected in philosophies, rationalities be formed, only, perhaps, to dissolve and vanish soon 
afterwards’ (xxiii). It is an archeological inquiry that addresses ‘itself to the general space of 
knowledge, to its configurations, and to the mode of being of the things that appear in it, 
defines systems of simultaneity, as well as the series of mutations necessary and sufficient to 
circumscribe the threshold of a new positivity’ (xxv). Foucault is concerned with ‘observing 
how a culture experiences the propinquity of things, how it establishes the tabula of their 
relationships and the order by which they must be considered’ (xxvi). As such he is primarily 
concerned with how a culture establishes the relation between language and things, with how 
order is established: the order of things. This archeological inquiry, Foucault states, ‘has 
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revealed two great discontinuities in the episteme of Western culture’: the first marks the end 
of the Renaissance and ‘inaugurates the Classical age, and the second […] marks the 
beginning of the modern age’ (xxiv). With regard to the first discontinuity, Foucault discusses 
Cervantes’ Don Quixote and with regard to the second Sade’s Justine and Juliette.  
Literature plays an important role in The Order of Things, because this book owes its 
existence to a passage of Borges, and because Cervantes and Sade are discussed in relation to 
the discontinuities. Why does Foucault ascribe such an important role to literature in a 
philosophical book that addresses itself to the general space of knowledge? By giving these 
literary examples, Foucault seems to imply that there is something that literature can do in 
relation to positive knowledge. The question: what is the status of literature?, is the central 
question of this thesis. What could the role and function of literature be with regard to these 
discontinuities Foucault establishes in the Western episteme? Such a discontinuity, Foucault 
states, ‘probably begins with an erosion from outside, from that space which is, for thought, 
on the other side, but in which it has never ceased to think from the very beginning’ (The 
Order of Things 56). What could Foucault mean with that? My hypothesis is that Foucault’s 
notion of heterotopias, which are outside spaces that have the property of contestation, could 
elucidate this sentence that a discontinuity begins from a space which is for thought on the 
other side. Foucault mentions heterotopias only two times; first in the preface of The Order of 
Things, where he states that heterotopias are often found in Borges, and second in a lecture he 
gave in 1967, which formed the basis for the text “Different Spaces”. Can literature be seen as 
a heterotopia? If so, could that mean that a discontinuity begins in literature?  
In the first chapter of this thesis I will explain the three different epistemes as Foucault 
describes them; the Renaissance, in which language is thought of as resemblance, the 
Classical age, in which language is thought of as representation, and the modern age, in which 
language acquires its own being and structural linguistics plays a fundamental role. I will also 
examine why Foucault discusses Cervantes and Sade with regard to these two discontinuities. 
In the second chapter I will examine what the role of Borges could be in The Order of Things. 
In the preface as well as in the last few pages of The Order of Things Foucault hints at the 
possibility of a third rupture, the possibility of an entire new episteme in which the subject 
disappears and language regains its lost unity, due to structuralism which caused a 
fragmentation of language. Because Foucault only hints at a third discontinuity and does not 
extensively describe this new form of thought, apart from saying that language will regain its 
unity with at its cost the disappearance of the subject, I will examine in the second chapter of 
this thesis, if Foucault could mean post-structuralism with this new form of thought, of which 
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Derrida and Barthes are exemplary thinkers. Since Foucault discusses Cervantes with regard 
to the first discontinuity, because he intervenes with thinking in resemblances, and Sade with 
regard the second, because he intervenes with thinking in representation, could it be that 
Borges, since Foucault announces a third discontinuity, takes a similar position? I will analyze 
four short stories written by Borges and examine if Borges could indeed take a similar 
position between the modern age and this new episteme. Borges should then intervene with 
structuralism, just like Cervantes and Sade did with the thought of their time.  
In the third and final chapter the questions what literature is, what its status is, and 
what it can do in relation to positive knowledge will be central. In order to answer these 
questions I will analyze Foucault’s notion of heterotopias, and I will analyze two essays 
which Foucault has written before The Order of Things, called “Language to Infinity” and 
“The Thought of the Outside” in which he addresses the being of literary language and asks 
what literature is.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7 
 
Chapter 1: About The Order of Things 
 
In The Order of Things Foucault analyzes the experience of order and its modes of being, and 
shows its development throughout the Western episteme since the beginning of the sixteenth 
century. Order, Foucault states, is ‘at one and the same time, that which is given in things as 
their inner law, the hidden network that determines the way they confront one another, and 
also that which has no existence except in the grid created by a glance, an examination, a 
language’ (xxi). It is a table upon which language intersects space and ‘that enables thought to 
operate upon the entities of our world, to put them in order, to divide them into classes, to 
group them according to names that designate their similarities and their differences’ (xix). 
Foucault explores the conditions of possibility of systems of knowledge, which is why he 
calls it an ‘archaeological inquiry’ (xxiv). On this account, Foucault states, ‘what should 
appear are those configurations within the space of knowledge which have given rise to the 
diverse forms of empirical science’ (xxiv). This means that according to Foucault, knowledge 
is historical a priori and is as such subject to change and discontinuous.  
Foucault distinguishes three systems of knowledge, or epistemes, and states that two 
great discontinuities can be seen in the way in which order is established and on what ground 
knowledge is founded, in the history of Western culture. The first major change, Foucault 
argues, marks the end of the Renaissance and ‘inaugurates the Classical age’ during the 
seventeenth century, and the second major change, marks the ‘beginning of the modern age’ 
at the beginning of the nineteenth century (xxiv). These discontinuities do not mean, Foucault 
states, that reason made any progress: ‘it was simply that the mode of being of things, and of 
the order that divided them up before presenting them to the understanding, was profoundly 
altered’ (xxiv). What Foucault means with such a discontinuity is ‘the fact that within the 
space of a few years a culture sometimes ceases to think as it had been thinking up till then 
and begins to think other things in a new way’ (56). With regard to the first discontinuity, 
Foucault discusses Cervantes’ Don Quixote and with regard to the second Sade’s Justine and 
Juliette. In this chapter I am going to explain the three different epistemes, the Renaissance, 
the Classical age, and the modern age, as described by Foucault. I am also going to explore 
why Foucault discusses the literature of Cervantes and Sade with regard to these 
discontinuities he establishes in the systems of knowledge. 
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1.1  The Renaissance  
Up to the sixteenth century, Foucault states, ‘resemblance played a constructive role in the 
knowledge of Western culture’ (19). The world was ordered on the basis of similarity between 
things. It was resemblance which was the primary form of knowledge, of knowing things. 
Resemblance, Foucault states, ‘was the invisible form of that which, from the depths of the 
world, made things visible; but in order that this form may be brought out into the light in its 
turn there must be a visible figure that will draw it out from its profound invisibility’ (30). 
This visible figure was a sign. Resemblances required a signature, for without a sign, without 
being legibly marked, resemblances would never become observable (32). The world of 
similarity, Foucault states, could ‘only be a world of signs’ (29). The world was seen as if it 
was covered with signs that had to be deciphered, and those signs ‘which reveal resemblances 
and affinities, are themselves no more than forms of similitude’ (36). In the Renaissance, 
language was thought of as a sign of things and formed a part of the world. Language and 
things were seen as interwoven, because language resembled those things. As such the 
relation of language to the world was ‘one of analogy rather than of signification’, Foucault 
states (41). ‘To search for a meaning is to bring to light a resemblance’ (33). Resemblance 
was at the same time the form and content of signs (47). It was in this ‘reciprocal cross-
reference of signs and similitudes’, in which the fundamental configuration of knowledge 
consisted during the period of the Renaissance (37). 
 
1.2  The Classical age 
At the beginning of the seventeenth century, Foucault states, ‘the profound kinship of 
language with the world’ became dissolved (47). Because of ‘an essential rupture in the 
Western world’, Foucault states, a field of knowledge has opened up, in which it is no longer 
resemblances but identities and differences which is what has become important (55). On the 
threshold of the Classical age, Foucault states, ‘thought ceases to move in the element of 
resemblance. Similitude is no longer the form of knowledge but rather the occasion of error, 
the danger to which one exposes oneself when one does not examine the obscure region of 
confusions’ (56). Things and words were separated from each other, and the sign ceases to be 
a form of the world, it is no longer bound ‘to what it marks by the solid and secret bonds of 
resemblance or affinity’ (64). Instead, the sign represents an idea and it is within the domain 
of knowledge ‘that the sign is to perform its signifying function’ (66). Thinking in terms of 
resemblance is replaced by a binary structure of the sign and the signified whereby the 
relation of the sign to its content ‘is not guaranteed by the order of things in themselves’ (70). 
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The signifying element, Foucault states, ‘has no content, no function, and no determination 
other than what it represents: it is entirely ordered upon and transparent to it […] and that 
which is signified resides, without residuum and without opacity, within the representation of 
the sign’ (71). As such, Foucault states, ‘the entire episteme of Western culture found its 
fundamental arrangements modified’ (60). 
 ‘With all their twists and turns’, Foucault states, the adventures of Don Quixote in 
Cervantes’ novel of the same name, form the boundary of thought by resemblance: ‘they mark 
the end of the old interplay between resemblance and signs and contain the beginnings of new 
relations’(51). The whole journey of Don Quixote, Foucault argues, ‘is a quest for similitudes: 
the slightest analogies are pressed into service as dormant signs that must be reawakened’ 
(52). But these resemblances and signs ‘have dissolved their former alliance; similitudes have 
become deceptive and verge upon the visionary or madness; things still remain stubbornly 
within their ironic identity: they are no longer anything but what they are; words wander off 
on their own, without content, without resemblance to fill their emptiness; they are no longer 
the marks of things; they lie sleeping between the pages of books and covered in dust’ (53). 
As such Cervantes’ Don Quixote, Foucault states, ‘is a negative of the Renaissance world’ 
(53). The endless search for similitudes, which was exemplary for Renaissance thought, and 
the decipherment of signs that would reveal the resemblances between things, is taken to its 
ultimate limit by Cervantes.  
Don Quixote, Foucault states, construed ‘the relations of world and language as people 
had done in the sixteenth century, decoding inns into castles and farm girls into ladies with no 
other key than the play of resemblance’, but this relation of language to the world is taken to 
its ultimate limit because Don Quixote sees nothing but resemblances and is alienated in 
analogy (228). In Don Quixote, Foucault argues, ‘identities and differences make endless 
sport of signs and similitudes, [and] language breaks of its old kinship with things’ (54). Signs 
and things, Foucault states, ‘no longer resemble each other. And between them, Don Quixote 
wanders off on his own’ (53). Yet language, Foucault states, ‘has not become entirely 
impotent. It now possesses new powers’, and contains the beginning of new relations (53). In 
the second part of the book, Foucault argues, ‘Don Quixote meets characters who have read 
the first part of his story and recognize him, the real man, as the hero of the book. Cervantes’ 
text turns back upon itself, thrusts itself back into its own density, and becomes the object of 
its own narrative’ (53). Don Quixote, Foucault argues, has achieved his reality between the 
first and the second part of the novel, which is ‘a reality he owes to language alone, and which 
resides entirely inside the words. Don Quixote’s truth is not in the relation of the words to the 
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world but in that slender and constant relation woven between themselves by verbal signs. 
The hollow fiction of epic exploits has become the representative power of language. Words 
have swallowed up their own nature as signs’ (54). As such, Cervantes’ Don Quixote marks 
the end of the interplay of resemblances and contains the beginning of new relations, the 
relation between the sign and representation, which is what becomes important, according to 
Foucault, in the Classical age.   
In the Classical age, Foucault states, ‘words have been allotted the task and power of 
“representing thought”; […] language represents thought as thought represents itself’ (86).  
According to Classical thought, Foucault argues, there is ‘no meaning exterior or anterior to 
the sign; no implicit presence of a previous discourse that must be reconstituted in order to 
reveal the autochthonous meaning of things. Nor, on the other hand, any act constitutive of 
signification or any genesis interior to consciousness. This is because there is no intermediary 
element, no opacity intervening between the sign and its content’ (73). It is completely 
transparent. In the Classical age, Foucault states, ‘the pure science of signs has value as the 
direct discourse of that which is signified’ (74).  The fundamental task of Classical ‘discourse’ 
was to ascribe a name to things: ‘to name is at the same time to give the verbal representation 
of a representation, and to place it in a general table. The entire Classical theory of language is 
organized around this central and privileged entity’ (128). In that name that was ascribed to 
things, their being was named (132). As such, what is characteristic for Classical thought is 
that the ordering of things is linked to ontology. From  the very outset, Foucault states, ‘this 
thought exists within an ontology rendered transparent by the fact that being is offered to 
representation without interruption; and within a representation illuminated by the fact that it 
releases the continuity of being’ (224).  
 According to Foucault, the essential problem of Classical thought ‘lay in the relations 
between name and order’ (226). The main concern was: ‘how to discover a nomenclature that 
would be a taxonomy, or how to establish a system of signs that would be transparent to the 
continuity of being’ (226). As such, the limit of knowledge in the Classical age ‘would be the 
perfect transparency of representations to the signs by which they are ordered’ (84). The 
whole Classical system of order, Foucault states, ‘the whole of that great taxinomia that 
makes it possible to know things by means of the system of their identities, is unfolded within 
the space that is opened up inside representation when representation represents itself, that 
area where being and the Same reside’ (227). The end of Classical thought, Foucault states, 
‘will coincide with the decline of representation, or rather with the emancipation of language, 
of the living being, and of need, with regard to representation’ (227). 
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1.3  The modern age 
The last years of the eighteenth century, Foucault states, ‘are broken by a discontinuity similar 
to that which destroyed Renaissance thought at the beginning of the seventeenth; then, the 
great circular forms in which similitude was enclosed were dislocated and opened so that the 
table of identities could be unfolded; and that table is now about to be destroyed in turn, while 
knowledge takes up residence in a new space’ (235). Because of this rupture, language ‘has 
lost its transparency and its major function in the domain of knowledge’ (322). In the 
Classical age Foucault states, language was a form of knowing, and as such knowing was 
automatically discourse:  
 
it was the immediate  and spontaneous unfolding of representations; it was in  
that order in the first place that representations received their primary signs, 
patterned and regrouped their common features, and established their 
relations of identity or attribution […] Thus, language occupied a 
fundamental situation in relation to all knowledge: it was only by the medium 
of language that the things of the world could be known. Not because it was a 
part of the world, ontologically interwoven with it (as in the Renaissance), but 
because it was the first sketch of an order in representations of the world; 
because it was the initial, inevitable way of representing representations. It 
was in language that all generality was formed. 
(322) 
 
Classical knowledge, Foucault states, ‘was profoundly nominalist’ (322). The fundamental 
task of language was to name things and to establish a system of signs which would be 
transparent to the continuity of being of these things. This relation of meaning with the form 
of truth and the form of being is what modern thought throws fundamentally into question 
(226). 
 From the nineteenth century, Foucault states, ‘language began to fold in upon itself, to 
acquire its own particular density, to deploy a history, an objectivity, and laws of its own’ 
(322). It acquired a being proper to itself and became one object of knowledge among others 
(322). The threshold between the Classical age and the modern age had been crossed when 
discourse ceased to function within representation as the means of ordering it, when ‘words 
ceased to intersect with representations and to provide a spontaneous grid for the knowledge 
of things’ (331). The idea that language acquires a being proper to itself and should be 
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detached from representation, is also characteristic for structuralism, of which Saussure is the 
founding father. Foucault mentions Saussure several times, but does not explain his ideas into 
full detail. Saussure exposed the arbitrary and differential character of the sign. The sign, 
according to Saussure, consists of the signified; the idea or concept, and the signifier; the 
written or spoken word. The signified and the signifier together form the sign, and they are 
both arbitrary and based on conventions. Representation of an object in the world plays no 
role within the relation between the signifier and the signified, there is no direct link between 
the sign and the thing. The identity of the sign is based upon difference with all the other 
signs. This principle of difference is the condition for signification.  
 Foucault also mentions Nietzsche several times, of whom he says that he is ‘the first to 
connect the philosophical task with a radical reflection on language’ (332). Again Foucault 
does not explain it into full detail. In his text “On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense”, 
published in 1873, Nietzsche states for example that truth does not exist. His thoughts on truth 
are based upon the traditional definition of truth, namely truth as adequatio rei et intellectus, 
which means that knowledge and reality correspond, that the thing in reality corresponds to 
the intellect. Truth as such, according to Nietzsche, does not exist, because between the thing 
in reality and the intellect, there is language. He asks: ‘are designations congruent with things 
[and] is language the adequate expression of all realities?’ (The Nietzsche Reader 116). His 
answer is no. A word is, according to Nietzsche, a metaphor of a metaphor. What happens is 
the following: first ‘a nerve stimulus is transferred into an image: first metaphor. The image, 
in turn, is imitated in a sound: second metaphor’ (116). Words are nothing but  metaphors of 
things and do not correspond at all with the actual things in reality, because of the generality 
of language and the uniqueness of each thing. A leaf is never totally the same as another leaf. 
Still we call both leafs a ‘leaf’. Every concept, Nietzsche states, arises ‘from the equation of 
unequal things’ and thereby that which is different is forgotten (117). Truths, Nietzsche 
writes, ‘are illusions which we have forgotten are illusions; they are metaphors that have 
become worn out and have been drained of sensuous force’ (117). Truth cannot exist because 
the correspondence between knowledge and reality does not exist, because language does not 
represent.  
 These questions that Saussure and Nietzsche both ask, like what is language, what is a 
sign, what is the relation between language and being, were made possible, Foucault states, by 
the fact that at the beginning of the nineteenth century, language became detached from 
representation (The Order of Things 333). In the modern age , Foucault states, ‘the reign of 
representative discourse, the dynasty of a representation signifying itself and giving voice in 
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the sequence of its words to the order that lay dormant within things’ comes to an end (227). 
Once language became detached from representation, it has existed, Foucault states, ‘right up 
to our own day, only in a dispersed way’ and appeared in a multiplicity of modes of being 
(332). 
 This reversal of knowledge and thought, is, Foucault argues, ‘contemporaneous’ with 
Sade’s literature, and especially his novels Justine and Juliette (227). These works, Foucault 
states, manifest ‘the precarious balance between the law without law of desire and the 
meticulous ordering of discursive representation. Here, the order of discourse finds its Limit 
and its Law; but it is still strong enough to remain coextensive with the very thing that 
governs it’ (227). Foucault argues that Justine and Juliette take, on the threshold of the 
modern age, the same position as Cervantes’ Don Quixote occupied between the Renaissance 
and the Classical age (228). Whereas Don Quixote, with his quest for similitudes, marked the 
limit of thinking in resemblances, Justine and Juliette mark the limit of representation. In the 
second part of the novel, Foucault states, Don Quixote ‘received his truth and his law’ from 
the represented world in the first part, in which he decoded inns into castles and farm girls 
into ladies by the play of resemblances (228). ‘He had only to allow himself to live in a castle 
in which he himself, having penetrated by means of his madness into the world of pure 
representation, finally became a mere character in the artifice of a representation’ (228). 
Sade’s characters correspond to Don Quixote, Foucault states, ‘at the other end of the 
Classical age, at the moment of its decline. It is no longer the ironic triumph of representation 
over resemblance; it is the obscure and repeated violence of desire battering at the limits of 
representation’ (228).  
According to Foucault, Sade presents in his novels a rigid sequence of ‘scenes’, which 
are ‘profligacy subjected to the order of representation’ (228). Justine, Foucault argues, 
corresponds to the second part of Don Quixote: ‘she is the unattainable object of the desire of 
which she is the pure origin, just as Don Quixote is, despite himself, the object of the 
representation which he also is in the depth of his being’ (228). In Justine, Foucault states, 
‘desire and representation communicate only through the presence of Another who represents 
the heroine to himself as an object of desire, while she herself knows nothing of desire other 
that its diaphanous, distant, exterior, and icy form as representation. Such is her misfortune: 
her innocence acts as a perpetual chaperone between desire and its representation’(228 -229).  
Foucault states that in Juliette ‘nomination is at last posited in its starkest nudity, and 
the rhetorical figures, which until then had been holding it in suspense, collapse and become 
the endless figures of desire – and the same names, constantly repeated, exhaust themselves in 
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their effort to cross those figures, without ever being able to reach their end’ (130). In Juliette 
‘every desire must be expressed in the pure light of a representative discourse’ (228). She is, 
Foucault states, ‘no more than the subject of all possible desires; but those desires are carried 
over, without any residuum, into the representation that provides them with a reasonable 
foundation in discourse and transforms them spontaneously into scenes’ (229). But desire in 
Sade’s literature is so thin and transparent, that it batters at the limits of representation. 
Juliette undermines the ‘inspissation of the represented so that, without the slightest blemish, 
the slightest reticence, the slightest veil, all the possibilities of desire may rise to the surface’ 
(229). Sade takes representation to its ultimate limit, by presenting the ceaselessly, rigid 
sequence of scenes in which every desire, every concatenation of reasons, has to be named. 
As such, Juliette, ‘closes the Classical age upon itself, just as Don Quixote had opened it’ 
(229). Sade, Foucault states, ‘attains the end of Classical discourse and thought. He holds 
sway precisely on their frontier’ (229). But it does not only mark the end of old relations, it 
also contains the beginnings of new relations, because with the ‘violence of the name being 
uttered at last for its own sake, language emerges in all its brute being as a thing’ (130).   
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, Foucault states, the law of discourse had 
been detached from representation, and the being of language itself became fragmented (333). 
But the disappearance of the primacy of representation had also another consequence.   
In Classical thought, Foucault states, ‘the personage for whom the representation exists, and 
who represents himself within it, recognizing himself therein as an image or reflection, he 
who ties together all the interlacing threads of the “representation in the form of a picture or 
table” – he is never to be found in that table himself’ (336). Before the end of the Classical 
age, ‘man did not exist – any more than the potency of life, the fecundity of labor, or the 
historical density of language’ (336). Language in so far as it represents existed only in order 
to be transparent; it named, patterned, combined, and connected and disconnected things as it 
made ‘them visible in the transparency of words’ (338). In this role, Foucault states, language 
transformed ‘the sequence of perceptions into a table, and cut up the continuum of beings into 
a pattern of characters’ (338). In the Classical experience, the possibility of knowing things 
and their order passed, ‘through the sovereignty of words’ which formed ‘a colorless network 
on the basis of which beings manifest themselves and representations are ordered’ (339). This 
had as an essential consequence that ‘Classical language, as the common discourse of 
representation and things, as the place within which nature and human nature intersect, 
absolutely excludes anything that could be “a science of man”’ (339).  
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 It is only in the modern age, when language is detached from representation and the 
relation between name and being is severed, that man appeared in his ‘ambiguous position as 
an object of knowledge and as a subject that knows’ (340). The human sciences, that take ‘as 
its object man as an empirical entity’, emerge in the modern age (375).  Man was included 
among the objects of science and the human sciences appeared ‘when man constituted himself 
in Western culture as both that which must be conceived of and that which is to be known’ 
(376). The human sciences are ‘an analysis that extends from what man is in his positivity 
(living, speaking, laboring being) to what enables this same being to know (or seek to know) 
what life is, in what the essence of labor and its laws consist, and in what way his is able to 
speak’ (385). It is the ‘first time since human beings have existed and have lived together in 
societies’ that they become an object of science, and this, Foucault states, is not an opinion or 
phenomenon, it ‘is an event in the order of knowledge’ (376). This event itself was ‘produced 
in a general redistribution of the episteme: when, abandoning the space of representation, 
living beings took up their places in the specific depths of life, wealth in the onward thrust of 
new forms of production, and words in the development of languages’ (376). 
 At the same time, Foucault argues, there appear also three ‘counter-sciences’; 
psychoanalysis, ethnology and structural linguistics (414). What they have in common, is that 
they do not question man himself, as he appears in the human sciences, ‘but the region that 
makes possible knowledge about man in general’, they span ‘the whole field of knowledge in 
a movement that tends to reach its boundaries’ (412). They are not so much three human 
sciences among others, but they span the entire domain of these sciences and what illuminates 
the space of their discourse, Foucault states, is ‘the historical a priori of all the sciences of 
man – those great caesuras, furrows, and dividing-lines which traced man’s outline in the 
Western episteme and made him a possible area of knowledge’ (413). Not only, Foucault 
states, ‘are they able to do without the concept of man, they are also unable to pass through it 
for they always address themselves to that which constitutes his outer limits […] They 
dissolve man’ (413). They are ‘counter-sciences’, not because they are less ‘rational’ or 
‘objective’ than the human sciences, but because ‘they flow in the opposite direction, they 
lead them back to their epistemological basis, and they ceaselessly “unmake” that very man 
who is creating and re-creating his positivity in the human sciences’ (414).  
 As a pure theory of language, linguistics plays a fundamental role; it provides 
psychoanalysis and ethnology their formal model. In linguistics, Foucault states, ‘one would 
have a science perfectly founded in the order of positivities exterior to man (since it is a 
question of pure language), which after traversing the whole space of the human sciences, 
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would encounter the question of finitude (since it is through language, and within it, that 
thought is able the think: so that it is in itself a positivity with the value of a fundamental)’ 
(415). Like psychoanalysis and ethnology, linguistics makes visible, Foucault states, ‘the 
frontier-forms of the human sciences; like them, it would situate its experience in those 
enlightened and dangerous regions where the knowledge of man acts out, in the form of the 
unconscious and of historicity, its relation with what renders them possible’ (416). In 
exposing that,  ‘these three counter-sciences threaten the very thing that made it possible for 
man to be known’ (416). But linguistics plays a more fundamental role than the other two, 
because, Foucault states, ‘it permits – or in any case strives to render possible – the 
structuration of contents themselves […] It is the principle of a primary decipherment: to a 
gaze forearmed by linguistics, things attain to existence only in so far as they are able to form 
the elements of a signifying system’ (416). Linguistic analysis as such is constitutive of its 
very object. The question of the being of language appears as a result of ‘the importance of 
linguistics and of its application to the knowledge of man’ (417). And, Foucault states, ‘the  
question of the being of language, which, as we have seen, is so intimately linked with the 
fundamental problems of our culture, reappears in all its enigmatic insistence’ (417). The 
question what language essentially is in its being, ‘is once more of the greatest urgency’ 
(417).  
 
1.4  Conclusion chapter 1 
So far, I have explained the configurations within the space of knowledge throughout the 
Western episteme and how Foucault describes the two great discontinuities that can be seen in 
the way in which order is established and on what ground knowledge is founded, in the 
history of Western culture. During the period of the Renaissance, resemblance played a 
constructive role within the field of knowledge. What was characteristic for Renaissance 
thought, was the endless search for similitudes and the decipherment of signs that would 
reveal those resemblances. At the beginning of the seventeenth century this configuration of 
knowledge in which resemblance played a constructive role, changes entirely. It is no longer 
resemblance, but representation which is what has become important. And it is this 
configuration that, Foucault states, ‘from the nineteenth century onward, changes entirely; the 
theory of representation disappears as the universal foundation of all possible orders; 
language as the spontaneous tabula, the primary grid of things, as an indispensible link 
between representation and things, is eclipsed in its turn’ (xxv). 
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 Foucault discusses Cervantes’ Don Quixote and Sade’s Justine and Juliette with 
regard to these discontinuities because they both take a certain position between two 
epistemes. Foucault discusses Cervantes with regard to the first discontinuity, because 
thinking in resemblances is taken in Don Quixote to its ultimate limit. But not only is the 
relation between language and things, as it was thought of during that period, taken to its 
ultimate limit, Don Quixote also already contains the beginnings of new relations between 
language and things as it will be thought of in the Classical age. On the threshold of the 
modern age, Sade’s novels Justine and Juliette take the same position as Cervantes’ Don 
Quixote took between the Renaissance and the Classical age. Now it is representation which is 
what is taken to its ultimate limit by Sade, by presenting the ceaselessly, rigid scenes in which 
every desire, presented as so thin and transparent, has to be named. Just like Don Quixote 
formed the boundary of Renaissance thought, Justine and Juliette form the boundary of 
Classical thought. And just like Don Quixote, they also already contain the beginnings of new 
relations between language and things, as it will be thought of in the modern age. 
 In the modern age, Foucault states, ‘language loses its privileged position and 
becomes, in its turn, a historical form coherent with the density of its own past. But as things 
become increasingly reflexive […], abandoning the space of representation, man enters in his 
turn, and for the first time, the field of Western knowledge’ (xxv). The one thing we can say 
in all certainty, Foucault states, ‘is that in Western culture the being of man and the being of 
language have never, at any time, been able to coexist and to articulate themselves one upon 
the other. Their incompatibility has been one of the fundamental features of our thought’ 
(369). The entire modern episteme, Foucault argues, ‘which was formed towards the end of 
the eighteenth century and still serves as the positive ground of our knowledge, that which 
constituted man’s particular mode of being, and the possibility of knowing him empirically – 
that entire episteme was bound up with the disappearance of Discourse and its featureless 
reign, with the shift of language towards objectivity, and with its reappearance in multiple 
form’ (420 – 421). But since the question of the being of language becomes more and more 
urgent and ‘language is now emerging with greater and greater insistence in a unity that we 
ought to think but cannot as yet do so, is this not the sign’ Foucault asks, ‘that the whole of 
this configuration is now about to topple, and that man is in the process of perishing as the 
being of language continues to shine ever brighter upon our horizon?’ (421). Will man, 
Foucault asks, ‘since man was constituted at a time when language was doomed to dispersion, 
[…] not be dispersed when language regains its unity?’ (421).  
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 Foucault implies several times that the ground on which modern knowledge is founded 
‘is once more stirring under our feet’ (xxvi). And since he states at the very beginning of the 
book, that ‘this book arose out of a passage in Borges, out of the laughter that shattered, as I 
read the passage, all the familiar landmarks of my thought – our thought, the thought that 
bears the stamp of our and age and our geography’, could it be that Borges’ literature takes 
the same position as Cervantes occupied between the Renaissance and the Classical age, and 
Sade between the Classical age and the modern age, now that the configuration of knowledge 
in the modern age might be about to topple and Foucault announces the possibility of entire 
new episteme? 
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Chapter 2 : About the postmodern episteme and Borges 
 
In the last few pages of The Order of Things, Foucault announces the possibility of an entire 
new episteme in which language regains its unity and in which man disappears in its turn. The 
configuration of knowledge might be about to topple again, and there may be formed a third 
rupture in the Western episteme. My hypothesis is that this third rupture, could be the break 
between structural linguistics, of which Saussure is the founding father, and post-structural 
linguistics; a label which is often put on Derrida’s theory of language. If that is what Foucault 
implies or could imply, since he does not say it as such, does language regains its unity in 
Derrida’s theory of language in such a way that it could be an example of this new form of 
thought which Foucault announces? As I have shown in the previous chapter, literature plays 
an important role in The Order of Things, because Foucault discusses Cervantes’ Don Quixote 
with regard to the first discontinuity, and Sade’s Justine and Juliette with regard to the 
second. Could it be that Borges takes the same position as Cervantes occupied between the 
Renaissance and the Classical age, and Sade between the Classical age and the modern age, 
now that the configuration of knowledge in the modern age might be about to topple and 
Foucault announces a third discontinuity? If so, Borges should intervene with structural 
linguistics, which is according to Foucault fundamental for modern thought, and take it to its 
ultimate limit, just like Cervantes did with resemblance and Sade with representation, and also 
already contain the beginnings of relations between language and things.  
 
2.1  The new episteme 
Questions like: what is language? What is a sign? What is the relation between language and 
being, and ‘is it really to being that language is always addressed – at least, language that 
speaks truly’?, were, Foucault states, made possible by the fact that since the nineteenth 
century discourse had been detached from representation and the being of language became 
fragmented (333). But these questions became inevitable Foucault states, ‘when, with 
Nietzsche, and Mallarmé, thought was brought back and violently so, towards language itself, 
towards its unique and difficult being. The whole curiosity of our thought now resides in the 
question: What is language, how can we find a way round it in order to make it appear in 
itself, in all its plenitude?’ (333-334). The question Foucault asks with regard to this is: are 
such questions on the subject of language ‘no more than a continuance, or at most a 
culmination, of the event that, as archaeology has shown, came into existence and began to 
take effect at the end of the eighteenth century?’ (334). If that is the case, Foucault argues: 
20 
 
 
The fragmentation of language, occurring at the same time as its transition to 
philological objectivity, would [then] be no more than the most recently 
visible (because the most secret and most fundamental) consequence of the 
breaking up of Classical order; by making the effort to master this schism and 
to make language visible in its entirety, we would bring to completion what 
had occurred before us, and without us, towards the end of the eighteenth 
century. But what, in that case, would that culmination be? In attempting to 
reconstitute the lost unity of language, is one carrying to its conclusion a 
thought which is that of the nineteenth century, or is one pursuing forms that 
are already incompatible with it? The dispersion of language is linked, in fact, 
in a fundamental way, with the archeological event we may designate as the 
disappearance of Discourse. To discover the vast play of language contained 
once more within a single space might be just as decisive a leap towards a 
wholly new form of thought as to draw to a close a mode of knowing 
constituted during the previous century. 
(334) 
 
Is the attempt to reconstitute the lost unity of language the conclusion of thought of the 
modern age, or is it already incompatible with it?  
 One of the fundamental features of our thought, Foucault states, is that throughout the 
Western culture the being of man and the being of language have never been able to coexist 
(369). The figure of man occurred between two modes of language; ‘he was constituted only 
when language, having been situated within representation and, as it were, dissolved in it, 
freed itself from that situation at the cost of its own fragmentation: man composed his own 
figure in the interstices of that fragmented language’ (421). Since man was constituted at a 
time when language was dispersed, will he, Foucault asks, ‘not be dispersed when language 
regains its unity?’ (421). The question as to what language is in its being, Foucault states,  is 
now ‘once more of the greatest urgency’ (417). At this point, Foucault argues, ‘where the 
question of language arises again with such heavy over-determination, and where it seems to 
lay siege on every side to the figure of man (that figure which had once taken the place of 
Classical Discourse), contemporary culture is struggling to create an important part of its 
present, and perhaps of its future’ (417). The appearance of man, Foucault states, ‘was not the 
liberation of an old anxiety, the transition into luminous consciousness of an age-old concern, 
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the entry into objectivity of something that had long remained trapped within beliefs and 
philosophies: it was the effect of a change in the fundamental arrangements of knowledge. As 
the archaeology of our thought easily shows, man is an invention of recent date’ (422). And 
perhaps it is an invention ‘nearing its end’ (422). 
 If the question of language indeed arises with such a heavy over-determination, if 
language regains its unity with at its cost the disappearance of man, then there could be seen, 
Foucault states several times, a third rupture in the Western world. But how could this new 
form of thought, of which Foucault announces its possibility, with its unity of language and 
disappearance of man, look like? What could Foucault mean with this unity of language? 
Foucault does not mention Derrida, and his post-structuralist linguistics, at all, but I think that 
Derrida’s ideas about language, could elucidate this new form of thought of this new 
episteme, as Foucault describes it.  
 
2.2  Derrida on language: writing and différance 
In his book Of Grammatology, Derrida puts into question the assumptions of Western 
metaphysics which are according to him at the same time logocentric as well as phonocentric. 
Throughout the history of philosophy, writing, Derrida states, has been confined ‘to a 
secondary and instrumental function: translator of a full speech that was fully present (present 
to itself, to its signified, to the other, the very condition of the theme of presence in general)’ 
(8). Derrida relates this phonocentrism, the primacy of speech, of spoken words, to 
logocentrism, which is the belief that, as Spivak puts it in his preface to Of Grammatology, 
‘the first and last things are the Logos, the Word, the Divine Mind, the infinite understanding 
of God, and infinitely creative subjectivity, and, closer to our time, the self-presence of full 
self-consciousness’ (lxviii). Derrida’s suggestion is, Spivak states, ‘that this phonocentrism-
logocentrism relates to centrism itself – the human desire to posit a “central” presence at 
beginning and end’ (lxviii). What Derrida puts into question is this idea of presence and the 
secondary and derivative function ascribed to writing.  
 Throughout the history of philosophy, the spoken word has been seen as more 
fundamental than the written word, Derrida states, because ‘the essence of the phonè would 
be immediately proximate to that which within “thought” as logos relates to “meaning”, 
produces it, receives it, speaks it, “composes” it’ (11). For Aristotle for example, Derrida 
argues, spoken words are the symbols of mental experience whereas written words are 
symbols of spoken words, because ‘the voice, producer of the first symbols, has a relationship 
of essential and immediate proximity with the mind’ (11). The voice, as the producer of the 
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first signifier, is not just a simple signifier among others, it is closest to the signified. All 
signifiers, Derrida states, ‘and first and foremost the written signifier, are derivative with 
regard to what would wed the voice indissolubly to the mind or to the thought of the signified 
sense, indeed to the thing itself’ (11). The written signifier, Derrida states, is ‘always technical 
and representative’, and this derivation ‘is the very origin of the notion of the “signifier”’ 
(11).  
 The notion of the sign, Derrida states, ‘always implies within itself the distinction 
between signifier and signified, even if, as Saussure argues, they are distinguished simply as 
the two faces of one and the same leaf’ (11). Even Saussure remains, according to Derrida, 
‘within the heritage of that logocentrism which is also a phonocentrism: absolute proximity of 
voice and being, of voice and the meaning of being, of voice and the ideality of meaning’, 
because he prescribed linguistics to be a study of speech, rather than of speech and writing 
(11-12). Throughout the history of philosophy, reading and writing, are seen as being 
preceded by ‘a truth, or a meaning already constituted by and within the element of the logos’ 
(14). The signified has had ‘at any rate an immediate relationship with the logos in general, 
and a mediated one with the signifier, that is to say with the exteriority of writing’ (15). The 
‘formal essence’ of the signified is seen as presence, Derrida states, and ‘the privilege of its 
proximity to the logos as phonè is the privilege of presence’ (18). Due to this privilege, a 
secondary and derivative function is ascribed to the written signifier: ‘a sign signifying a 
signifier itself signifying an eternal verity, eternally thought and spoken in the proximity of a 
present logos’ (15).   
 According to Derrida, Saussure does not recognize in writing ‘more than a narrow and 
derivative function. Narrow because it is nothing but one modality among others […] 
Derivative because representative: signifier of the first signifier, representation of the self-
present voice, of the immediate, natural, and direct signification of the meaning (of the 
signified, of the concept, of the ideal object)’ (30). Writing, Derrida states, or ‘the letter, the 
sensible inscription, has always been considered by Western tradition as the body and matter 
external to the spirit, to breath, to speech, and to the logos’ (35). In Of Grammatology, 
Derrida turns against the phonocentrism-logocentrism and the derivative function of writing. 
What is more fundamental is not speech, but writing. Derrida uses the name writing not only 
to designate writing in the narrow sense, a graphic notion, but ‘to an entire structure of 
investigation’, as Spivak puts it (lxix).  
By a slow movement, Derrida states, ‘whose necessity is hardly perceptible, 
everything that for at least some twenty centuries tended toward and finally succeeded in 
23 
 
being gathered under the name of language is beginning to let itself be transferred to, or at 
least summarized under, the name of writing’ (6). It seems as though, Derrida argues, that ‘the 
concept of writing – no longer indicating a particular, derivative, auxiliary form of language 
in general, no longer designating the exterior surface, the insubstantial double of a major 
signifier, the signifier of the signifier – is beginning to go beyond the extension of language. 
In all senses of the word, writing thus comprehends language’ (6-7). That does not mean that:  
 
the word “writing” has ceased to designate the signifier of the signifier, but it 
appears, strange at it may seem, that “signifier of the signifier” no longer 
defines accidental doubling and fallen secondarity. “Signifier of the signifier” 
describes on the contrary the movement of language: in its origin, to be sure, 
but one can already suspect that an origin whose structure can be expressed as 
“signifier of the signifier” conceals and erases itself in its own production. 
There the signified always already functions as a signifier. The secondarity 
that it seemed possible to ascribe to writing alone affects all signifieds in 
general, affects them always already, the moment they enter the game. There 
is not a single signified that escapes, even if recaptured, the play of signifying 
references that constitute language.  
(7) 
 
As such, the way in which Derrida uses the name writing, is not just a simple reversal of 
hierarchy, but it designates the structure of writing, which applies not only to writing itself, 
but to language and the sign in general. The rationality, Derrida states, ‘which governs a 
writing thus enlarged and radicalized, no longer issues from a logos. Further, it inaugurates 
the destruction, not the demolition but the de-sedimentation, the de-construction, of all the 
significations that have their source in that of the logos. Particularly the signification of truth’ 
(10).  
 What Derrida puts at stake here, is the idea of presence. In his text “Différance”, 
Derrida argues that the ‘sign is usually said to be put in the place of the thing itself’, that the 
sign, ‘represents the present in its absence’, and as such is deferred presence (Margins of 
Philosophy 9). According to classical semiology, Derrida states, ‘the substitution of the sign 
for the thing itself is both secondary and provisional: secondary due to an original and lost 
presence from which the sign thus derives; provisional as concerns this final and missing 
presence toward which the sign in this sense is a movement of mediation’ (9). Derrida puts 
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the provisional secondariness of the substitute into question and opposes to it the play of 
‘différance’ (10). Différance refers simultaneously to the two meanings of the Latin verb 
différer: to defer and to differ. The condition for signification is the principle of difference, 
which ‘affects the totality of the sign, that is the sign as both signified and signifier’, and at 
the same time there is a deferring, a putting off until later, of presence, of the signified, 
because the signifier refers to all the other signifiers from which it differs, and the signified as 
such is never present (10). The signified concept, Derrida states, ‘is never present in and of 
itself, in a sufficient presence that would refer only to itself. Essentially and lawfully, every 
concept is inscribed in a chain or in a system within which it refers to the other, to other 
concepts, by means of the systematic play of differences’ (11).  
These differences, Derrida states, ‘are “produced” – deferred – by différance’ (14). But 
this ‘does not mean that the différance that produces differences is somehow before them, in a 
simple and unmodified – indifferent – present. Différance is the non-full, non-simple, 
structured and differentiating origin of differences. Thus, the name “origin” no longer suits it’ 
(11). Différance is a movement of deferring and differing, which does not have an origin and 
does not lead toward a final, and fixed meaning. It does not have an absolute point of 
departure nor a final endpoint. As such, the sign, the graphic sign as well as the phonic sign, is 
a structure of difference, and Derrida suggests, Spivak states, ‘that what opens the possibility 
of thought is not merely the question of being, but also the never-annuled difference from “the 
completely other”. Such is the strange “being” of the sign: half of it always “not there” and 
the other half always “not that”. The structure of the sign is determined by the trace or track of 
that other which is forever absent’ (Of Grammatology xvii). Derrida gives the name “trace”, 
Spivak states, ‘to the part played by the radically other within the structure of difference that 
is the sign’, it is the ‘mark of the absence of a presence, an always already absent present, of 
the lack of origin that is the condition of thought and experience’ (xvii).  
The trace, Derrida states in Of Grammatology, is ‘the absolute origin of sense in 
general. Which amounts to saying once again that there is no absolute origin of sense in 
general. The trace is the difference which opens appearance and signification’ (65). The trace, 
Derrida argues, affects the totality of the sign, that is both the signifier as well as the signified. 
‘The signified is ordinarily and essentially (and not only for a finite and created spirit) trace, 
that it is always already in the position of the signifier, is the apparently innocent proposition 
within which the metaphysics of the logos, of presence and consciousness, must reflect upon 
writing as its death and its resource’ (73). The way in which Derrida thus uses the concept 
“writing”, is much broader than the empirical concept of writing, it is, Spivak states, ‘the 
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name of the structure always already inhabited by the trace’ (xxxix). The usual notion of 
writing in the narrow sense, Spivak states, ‘does contain the elements of the structure of 
writing in general: the absence of the “author” […] We “recognize” all this in writing in the 
narrow sense and “repress” it, this allows us to ignore that everything else is also inhabited by 
the structure of writing in general, that the “thing itself always escapes”’ (lxix). Writing in 
general, Derrida states, ‘covers the entire field of linguistic signs’ (44). ‘There is no linguistic 
sign before writing’ (14). Or as Derrida puts it further on in his book: ‘there is nothing outside 
of the text [there is no outside-text]’ (158).  
How could Derrida’s ideas about language elucidate, as I  have said above, this new 
form of thought in this new episteme, of which Foucault announces its possibility? Does 
language in Derrida’s philosophy regains its unity in some way? Is the ‘vast play of language 
contained once more within a single space’ (The Order of Things 334)? By deconstructing 
binary oppositions like the signifier and signified, the sensible and intelligible, speech and 
writing, as they are distinguished in Saussure’s linguistics, what Derrida puts at stake is the 
idea of presence and meaning. By putting these binary oppositions into question, which are 
not only exemplary for Saussure’s linguistics but for the whole metaphysical tradition in 
general, which is according to Derrida both logocentric and phonocentric, by stating that not 
speech is more fundamental but writing, he does not simply reverse these hierarchies but 
shows that everything is always already inhabited by the structure of writing, the play of 
différance, the trace. Not only writing is marked by absence, the absence of the author, 
everything else is also already marked by absence, and as such inhabited by the structure of 
writing, because the presence, the thing itself, is never present as such, the presence is always 
absent. The signified always already functions like the signifier, it is always already inhabited 
by the trace, inscribed in a chain in which it refers to all others by means of the systematic 
play of differences, and this play is the play of différance. Because the difference between 
“différence” with an e and “différance” with an a in French is inaudible, Derrida emphasizes 
the importance of writing as a structure. Différance is the movement of difference and 
deferral, every sign always differs from all the other signs while at the same time presence is 
being endlessly deferred. As such meaning is never fixed, is never stable, has no origin and no 
final endpoint.  
You could say that language in Derrida’s philosophy regains its unity in way, although 
not at all in the sense that there is a unified meaning, but because Derrida undoes and 
deconstructs these binary oppositions. There is no distinction between speech and writing; 
speech already functions like writing. There is no distinction between the signifier and 
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signified; the signified is always already in the position of the signifier. The whole sign, that 
is both signifier and signified, is determined by the trace of that other from which it differs 
and which is always absent. By stating that writing covers the whole field of language and 
signs, that there is no linguistic sign before writing, the play of language takes place in a way 
once more in a single space; the field of writing. There is no meaning outside the linguistic 
system, there are no significations that have their source in that of the logos, there is no 
transcendental signified, there is ‘no transcendent truth outside the field of writing’ (Margins 
of Philosophy 7). As such, this third rupture in the Western episteme, of which Foucault 
announces its possibility, which will occur when language regains its unity and takes place 
again in a single space, could be the break, although Foucault does not state it this way, 
between structural linguistics, which plays according to Foucault a fundamental role in the 
modern age, and post-structural linguistics, as Derrida’s work is often characterized, and 
would then be the break between the modern age, and an episteme that could be described as 
the postmodern age.  
 
2.3  Foucault on modern literature and Borges 
Thus the question of the being of language, which, as we have seen,  Foucault states in The 
Order of Things, ‘is so intimately linked with the fundamental problems of our culture, 
reappears in all its enigmatic insistence’ (417). These questions on the being of language 
‘concern a general formalization of thought and knowledge’ (417). But the question of 
language is not only posed in formal reflection, it is also posed in literature. At the other 
extremity of our culture, Foucault states, ‘the question of language is entrusted to that form of 
speech which has no doubt never ceased to pose it, but which is now, for the first time, posing 
it to itself’ (418). ‘That literature in our day is fascinated by the being of language’, Foucault 
argues, ‘is neither the sign of an imminent end nor proof of a radicalization: it is a 
phenomenon whose necessity has its roots in a vast configuration in which the whole structure 
of our thought and our knowledge is traced’ (418). But, Foucault continues, if the question of 
formal languages: 
 
gives prominence to the possibility or impossibility of structuring positive 
contents, a literature dedicated to language gives prominence, in all their 
empirical vivacity, to the fundamental forms of finitude. From within 
language experienced and traversed as language, in the play of its possibilities 
extended to their furthest point, what emerges is that man has “come to an 
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end”, and that, by reaching the summit of all possible speech, he arrives not at 
the very heart of himself but at the brink of that which limits him; in that 
region where death prowls, where thought is extinguished, where the promise 
of the origin interminably recedes. 
(418) 
 
In this new being of literature, the figure of finitude posits itself in language, Foucault states, 
‘as that which unveils itself within it, but also before it, preceding it, as that formless, mute, 
unsignifying region where language can find its freedom’ (418). It is in this space that 
literature posits itself as experience: ‘as experience of death (and in the element of death), of 
unthinkable thought (and in its inaccessible presence), of repetition (of original innocence, 
always there at the nearest and yet always the most distant limit of language); as experience of 
finitude (trapped in the opening and tyranny of that finitude)’ (418-419). The fact that the 
question of language is being posed, Foucault states, ‘in literature as well as in formal 
reflection […] prove no doubt that man is in the process of disappearing’ (420). Which could 
be a sign that the whole configuration of the modern age is about to topple.  
 Although Foucault does not mention Borges in this respect, at the end of his book 
where he announces the possibility of a new episteme, he does quote a whole passage of 
Borges’ text “John Wilkins’ Analytical Language”, in the preface of The Order of Things, and 
states that this passage shatters ‘our thought’, which is thus the thought of the modern age, 
because it disturbs and threatens to collapse our ‘age-old distinction between the Same and 
the Other’ (xvi). In this passage of  “John Wilkins’ Analytical Language” which Foucault 
quotes, Borges quotes a certain Chinese encyclopedia in which is written that:  
  
 Animals are divided into (a) those that belong to the emperor; (b) embalmed 
ones; (c) those that are trained; (d) suckling pigs; (e) mermaids; (f) fabulous 
ones; (g) stray dogs; (h) those that are included in this classification; (i) those 
that tremble if they were mad; (j) innumerable ones; (k) those drawn with a 
very fine camel’s-hair brush; (l) etcetera; (m) those that have just broken the 
flower vase; (n) those that at a distance resemble flies.  
(Borges, Selected Non-Fictions 231) 
 
In the wonderment of Borges’ classification, Foucault states, ‘the thing we apprehend in one 
great leap, the thing that, by means of the fable, is demonstrated as the exotic charm of 
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another system of thought, is the limitation of our own, the stark impossibility of thinking 
that. But what is it impossible to think, and what kind of impossibility are we faced with 
here?’ (xvi). What is impossible, are not the fabulous animals, Foucault states, since they are 
designated as such, but ‘the narrowness of the distance separating them from (and juxtaposing 
them to) the stray dogs, or the animals that from a long way of look like flies. What 
transgresses the boundaries of all imagination, of all possible thought, is simply that 
alphabetical series (a,b,c,d) which links each of those categories to all the others’ (xvii).  
 What is impossible, Foucault states, ‘is not the propinquity of the things listed, but the 
very site on which their propinquity would be possible’ (xviii). The ‘monstrous quality’ that 
runs through Borges’ classification, Foucault argues, consists in the fact ‘that the common 
ground on which such meetings are possible has itself been destroyed’ (xviii). Where could, 
Foucault asks, the animals listed in this classification ‘ever meet, except in the immaterial 
sound of the voice pronouncing their enumeration, or on the page transcribing it?’ (xviii). 
Foucault continues:  
  
Where else could they be juxtaposed except in the non-place of language? 
Yet, though language can spread them before us, it can do so only in an 
unthinkable space. The central category of animals “included in the present 
classification”, with its explicit reference to paradoxes we are familiar with, is 
indication enough that we shall never succeed in defining a stable relation of 
contained to container between each of these categories and that which 
includes them all: if all the animals divided up here can be placed without 
exception in one of the divisions of this list, then aren’t all the other divisions 
to be found in that one division too? An then again, in what space would that 
single, inclusive division have its existence? Absurdity destroys the and of 
the enumeration by making impossible the in where the things enumerated 
would be divided up.   
(xviii) 
 
Borges, Foucault states, does not add a figure to the impossible, ‘he simply dispenses with the 
least obvious, but most compelling, of necessities; he does away with the site, the mute 
ground upon which it is possible for entities to be juxtaposed’ (xviii). What Borges presents 
here is the unthinkable thought, because he destroys the ground upon which such meetings are 
possible.  
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The concept of language plays a significant role in many of Borges’ short stories. The 
fact that in literature the question of language is being posed, could be, as I have said, 
according to Foucault a sign that the thought of the modern age has come to an end. Since 
Foucault discusses this passage of  “The Analytical Language of John Wilkins” of Borges 
extensively in the preface of The Order of Things, with regard to ‘our thought’, which is the 
thought of the modern age, could it be that Borges takes the same position as Cervantes 
occupied between the Renaissance and the Classical age, and Sade between the Classical age 
and the modern age, now that the thought of the modern age might come to its end? If Borges 
indeed takes up the same position, Borges should intervene with structural linguistics, which 
is according to Foucault fundamental for modern thought, and take it to its ultimate limit, just 
like Cervantes did with thinking in resemblances and Sade with representation, and also 
already contain the beginnings of relations between language and being. I will now analyze 
four of Borges’ short stories, in which language plays a significant role, and also discuss his 
essay “The Analytical Language of John Wilkins”, and examine if Borges indeed could take 
the same position as Cervantes and Sade.  
 
2.4  Language in four short stories of Borges 
In his essay “The Analytical Language of John Wilkins”, Borges writes about John Wilkins’ 
attempt to create a ‘universal language’ in which ‘each word defines itself’ (Selected Non-
Fictions 230). John Wilkins divided, Borges writes, ‘the universe into forty categories or 
classes, which were then subdivided into differences, and subdivided in turn into species. To 
each class he assigned a monosyllable of two letters; to each difference, a consonant; to each 
species, a vowel. For example, de means element; deb, the first of elements, fire; deba, a 
portion of the element of fire, a flame’ (230). Whereas all the natural languages are all 
inexpressive, Wilkins tried to create an analytical language that would be expressive, that is a 
language ‘in which the name of each being would indicate all the details of its fate, past and 
future’ (232). While ‘the word salmon tells us nothing’, the corresponding word ‘zana’, in 
Wilkins analytical language, ‘defines (for the person versed in the forty categories and the 
classes of those categories) a scaly river fish with reddish flesh’ (232). But, Borges argues, 
Wilkins’ project is just as arbitrary and ambiguous as the classification of animals in this 
certain Chinese encyclopedia, which is quoted earlier. ‘There is no classification of the 
universe that is not arbitrary and speculative’, Borges writes (231). That is because: ‘we do 
not know what the universe is’ (231).  
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 A project similar to Wilkins’, occurs in Borges’ short story “Funes, His memory”. The 
narrator tells us about a boy named Ireneo Funes, who became ‘crippled’ after being bucked 
off a horse, but gained perfect perception and memory after his fall (Collected Fictions 132). 
Now Funes could remember, the narrator tells us, for example ‘the forms of the clouds in the 
southern sky on the morning of April 30, 1882, and he could compare them in his memory 
with the veins in the marbled binding of a book he had seen only once’ (135). The narrator 
tells us about two of Funes’ projects, which are according to the narrator ‘foolish, even 
preposterous, but […] reveal a certain halting grandeur’ (136).  The first project was the 
invention of ‘an infinite vocabulary for the natural series of numbers’ (136). He had invented, 
the narrator says, ‘a numbering system original with himself’, in which ‘every word had a 
particular figure attached to it, a sort of marker’ and within ‘a very few days he had passed the 
twenty-four thousand mark (135-136). ‘Instead of seven thousand thirteen (7013), he would 
say for instance, “Máximo Pérez”; instead of seven thousand fourteen (7014), “the railroad”; 
other numbers were “Luis Melián Lafinur”, “Olimar”, “sulfur”, “clubs”’ etc (136). The other 
project was creating a ‘mental catalog of all the images of his memory’ (136). The narrator 
tells us that:  
 
In the seventeenth century, Locke postulated (and condemned) an impossible 
language in which each individual thing – every stone, every bird, every 
branch – would have its own name; Funes once contemplated a similar 
language, but discarded the idea as too general, too ambiguous. The truth 
was, Funes remembered not only every leaf of every tree in every patch of 
forest, but every time he had perceived or imagined that leaf. He resolved to 
reduce every one of his past days to some seventy thousand recollections, 
which he would then define by numbers. Two considerations dissuaded him: 
the realization that the task was interminable, and the realization that it was 
pointless. He saw that by the time he died he would still not have finished  
classifying all the memories of his childhood.  
(136) 
 
Funes remembered everything in full detail, was not able to forget anything, and because of 
that, he was, the narrator says, ‘incapable of general, platonic ideas’ (136). What is being 
suggested here, is that being able to generalize, that being able to abstract means being able to 
forget.  
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Because Funes was incapable of general ideas, the narrator states that ‘he was not very 
good at thinking. To think is to ignore (or forget) differences, to generalize, to abstract. In the 
teeming world of Ireneo Funes there was nothing but particulars – and they were virtually 
immediate particulars’ (137). Not only was it difficult for Funes, the narrator says, ‘that the 
generic symbol “dog” took in all the dissimilar individuals of all shapes and sizes, it irritated 
him that the “dog” of three-fourteen in the afternoon, seen in profile, should be indicated by 
the same noun as the dog of three-fifteen, seen frontally’ (136). Funes could not understand 
that to use language is to treat something as a member of a class, that to use language is to 
categorize. It annoyed Funes that in language, words do not represent or refer to things in 
reality, which is why he tried to create a language in which signs do refer to particular things, 
although he gave up when he realized that it was pointless. Funes, was, as the narrator 
describes him: ‘the solitary, lucid spectator of a multiform, momentaneous, and almost 
unbearably precise world’ (136). And the story ends with the notification that: ‘Ireneo Funes 
died in 1889 of pulmonary congestion’ (137).   
 Two or three times, the narrator tells us, Funes ‘had reconstructed an entire day; he 
had never once erred or faltered, but each reconstruction had itself taken an entire day’ (135). 
Such a reproduction becomes useless, just like the map in the short story “On Exactitude in 
Science”, in which the narrator describes an Empire, in which the art of cartography ‘attained 
such perfection that the map of a single Province occupied the entirety of a City, and the map 
of the Empire, the entirety of a Province’ (Collected Fictions 325). In time, the narrator says, 
the ‘unconscionable maps, no longer satisfied’ and the cartographers ‘struck a map of the 
Empire whose size was that of the Empire, and which coincided point for point with it’ (325). 
But later generations were not so fond with it, they ‘saw that the map was useless’ and 
discarded the map (325). In his article “Borges/Derrida/Foucault”,  Toro states that this map, 
which ‘is an exact replica of the empire’s topography’, becomes useless and worthless ‘due to 
the saturation of meaning and to its exact duplication and simulation’ (139).  
 In the story “Pierre Menard, Author of the Quixote”, there occurs again such a 
repetition or reproduction. In this story, the narrator tells us about Pierre Menard’s project of 
rewriting ‘the ninth and thirty-eight chapters of Part I of Don Quixote and a fragment of 
Chapter XXII’, which is, the narrator says, ‘perhaps the most significant writing of our time’ 
(Collected Fictions 90). Menard, we are told, ‘dedicated his scruples and his nights “lit by 
midnight oil” to repeating in a foreign tongue a book that already existed’ (95). His 
‘admirable ambition’, the narrator says, ‘was to produce a number of pages which coincided – 
word for word and line for line – with those of Miguel de Cervantes’ (91). In order to achieve 
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his goal, Menard’s initial method was ‘relatively simple: Learn Spanish, return to 
Catholicism, fight against the Moor or Turk, forget the history of Europe from 1602 to 1918 – 
be Miguel de Cervantes’ (91). But Menard ‘discarded it as too easy’ (91). ‘Being, somehow, 
Cervantes’, the narrator tells us, ‘and arriving thereby at the Quixote – that looked to Menard 
less challenging (and therefore less interesting) than continuing to be Pierre Menard and 
coming to the Quixote trough the experiences of Pierre Menard’ (91).  
 While ‘Cervantes text and the Menard text are verbally identical’, Menard’s text, the 
narrator says ‘is almost infinitely richer. (More ambiguous, his detractors will say – but 
ambiguity is richness)’ (94). Why is Menard’s exact duplication ‘infinitely richer’? What is 
being put into question here is meaning. Who gives meaning? Is it the author? Or the reader? 
These questions are also posed by Roland Barthes, years later, in his text “The Death of 
Author”. This text is directed against the power of the author and his intentions, is directed 
against the idea of the author as subject who provides his text with a meaning, which the 
reader has to discover. According to Barthes the author does not stand at the origin of a text, 
as if the text is a message from the ‘Author-God’, and of which you, as a reader, could give, if 
you read well, the perfect interpretation that would explain the text precisely as the author has 
meant it. Writing, Barthes states, ‘is the destruction of every voice, of every point of origin’ 
(Image, Music, Text 142). It is the reader who interprets, who writes while he is reading. The 
reader is born, at the cost of the author because ‘to give a text an Author is to impose a limit 
on that text, to furnish it with a final signified, to close writing’ (147). The birth of the reader 
has as a consequence the death of the author, the author as subject who gives meaning and 
who stands at the origin of a text. With the death of the author, the idea that the text holds a 
‘secret’, that there is an ultimate meaning which can be discovered, disappears. Meaning is 
never fixed, has no origin.   
What is being put at stake in Borges’ story “Pierre Menard, the Author of the 
Quixote”, is meaning and the notion of the origin, since Menard’s text is an exact 
reproduction of Cervantes’, but endlessly richer. It is as such about the act of reading, because 
it is Menard who interprets the text, who comes to the Quixote, not by becoming Cervantes, 
but ‘through the experiences of Pierre Menard’, that is, he reads the Quixote in light of all the 
events in history that occurred after 1602 (Collected Fictions 91). While, the narrator says, 
‘Cervantes crudely juxtaposes the humble provincial reality of his country against the 
fantasies of the romance, […] Menard chooses as his “reality” the land of Carmen during the 
century that saw the Battle of Lepanto and the plays of Lope the Vega’ (93). That is why, 
although identical, Menard’s text is not the same as Cervantes’; it is read within another 
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context. What the story implies, is that there is no original meaning, given by the author to a 
text, that can be discovered. By undermining the primacy of the author, this story is an 
example of Barthes notion of a text, which is according to him ‘a multi-dimensional space in 
which a variety of writings, none of them original, blend and clash’ (Image, Music, Text 146). 
The place in which this  multiplicity is focused is not the author, but the reader, it is the reader 
who, Barthes states, without history, biography, and psychology, is simply ‘that someone who 
holds together in a single field all the traces by which the written text is constituted’ (148). It 
is Menard, the reader, and not Cervantes, the author, who, by re-writing the ‘original’ text 
word for word, interprets the text and gives a meaning to it. 
 Meaning is also being put at stake, though in a different way, in Borges’ short story 
“The Library of Babel”. In this story, the universe, ‘which others call the Library’, is 
described as being ‘composed of an indefinite, perhaps infinite number of hexagonal 
galleries’ (Collected Fictions 112). The arrangement of the galleries, the narrator tells us, ‘is 
always the same: Twenty bookshelves, five to each side, line four of the hexagon’s six sides’ 
(112). And ‘each wall of each hexagon is furnished with five bookshelves; each bookshelf 
holds thirty-two books identical in format; each book contains four hundred ten pages; each 
page, forty lines; each line; approximately eighty black letters’ (113). Though the content of 
most books is chaotic and random, consists of mostly ‘senseless cacophony, verbal nonsense, 
and incoherency’, a librarian once posited the following fact: the library contains all possible 
books (114).  The narrator tells us that:  
 
In all the Library, there are no two identical books. From those 
incontrovertible premises, the librarian deduced that the Library is “total” – 
perfect, complete, and whole – and that its bookshelves contain all possible 
combinations of the twenty-two orthographic symbols (a number which, 
though unimaginably vast, is not infinite) – that is, all that is able to be 
expressed, in every language. 
 (114-115) 
 
Thus, the Library contains every possible book, contains everything that can be thought or 
expressed. ‘There was no personal problem, no world problem, whose eloquent solution did 
not exist – somewhere in some hexagon’ (115).  
It is argued, the narrator tells us, that a ‘total book’ exists (117), somewhere on some 
shelf in some hexagon, there is a book which is ‘the cipher and perfect compendium of all 
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other books, and some librarian must have examined that book; this librarian is analogous to a 
god’ (116). People have searched endlessly in order to find this ‘total book’, the narrator says, 
and used the following method: ‘To locate book A, first consult book B, which tells where 
book A can be found; to locate book B, first consult book C, and so on, to infinity…’ (117). 
The certainty, the narrator says, that somewhere in the Library some bookshelf contained such 
a precious book like the ‘total book’, or a book in which the origin of the Library and time is 
revealed, ‘yet that those precious books were forever out of reach, was almost unbearable’ 
(116). Because these books endlessly refer to each other, it is impossible to find that one book 
which would explain everything. The final signified is forever out of reach. And because the 
Library contains everything: ‘the faithful catalog of the Library’, for example, and ‘thousands 
and thousands of false catalogs, the proof of the falsity of those false catalogs, a proof of the 
falsity of the true catalog’, because the Library contains everything that can be thought or 
expressed, in every possible language, because the Library is total, you could say that there is 
as such nothing outside the Library (115). There is, the narrator says, ‘no combination of 
characters one can make – dhcmrlchtdj, for example – that the divine Library has not foreseen 
and that in one or more of its secret tongues does not hide a terrible significance’ (117). To 
speak, the narrator says:  
 
Is to commit tautologies. This pointless, verbose epistle already exists in one 
of the thirty volumes of the five bookshelves in one of the countless hexagons 
– as does its refutation. (A number n of the possible languages employ the 
same vocabulary; in some of them, the symbol “library” possesses the correct 
definition “everlasting, ubiquitous system of hexagonal galleries,” while a 
library – the thing – is a loaf of bread or pyramid or something else, and the 
six words that define it themselves have other definitions. You who read me – 
are you certain you understand my language?)  
(117-118) 
 
What is being put at stake in this story, is a final signified, a fixed and stable meaning.  
 
2.5  Borges’ literature and the new (postmodern) episteme 
As I have shown, language and meaning plays a significant role in those four stories of 
Borges. What is being put at stake in these stories, as well as in his essay, is the notion of the 
origin. In both his essay “The Analytical Language of John Wilkins” as in his story “Funes, 
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His Memory”, the projects of John Wilkins and Funes, their attempt to create an ideal 
taxonomy in which signs would refer to and name particular things, are criticized. Whereas 
Borges points out that in Wilkins’s analytical language, the ‘whale appears in the sixteenth 
category: it is a viviparous, oblong fish’(Non Fictions 231) , and is as such still ambiguous, 
redundant, and deficient, the narrator in “Funes, his Memory”, tries to explain to Funes that 
‘his rhapsody of unconnected words was exactly the opposite of number system. I told him 
that when one said “365” one said “three hundreds, six tens, and five ones”, a breakdown 
impossible with the “numbers” Nigger Timoteo or a ponchoful of meat. Funes either could not 
or would not understand me’ (Collected Fictions 136). Every language, natural as well as 
analytical, is always provisional, an ‘exercise in chaos’, and imperfect, as Borges states it in 
his essay (Non Fictions 231). All classifications are arbitrary and ambiguous because we ‘do 
not know what the universe is’, that is the thing outside language (231). And he adds: ‘we 
must go even further, and suspect that there is no universe in the organic, unifying sense of 
that ambiguous word. If there is, then we must speculate on its purpose; we must speculate on 
the words, definitions, etymologies, and synonymies of God’s secret dictionary’ (Selected 
Non-Fictions 231). 
 In both stories “On Exactitude in Science” and “Pierre Menard, the Author of the 
Quixote”, the origin is put at stake due to exact duplications. In Of Grammatology, Derrida 
states that:  
 
Representation mingles with what it represents […] In this play of 
representation, the point of origin becomes ungraspable. There are things like 
reflecting pools, and images, an infinite reference from one to the other, but 
no longer a source, a spring. There is no longer a simple origin. For what is 
reflected is split in itself and not only as an addition to itself of its image. The 
reflection, the image, the double, splits what it doubles. 
(36) 
 
This statement, that the reflection splits what it doubles, is reflected in both “On Exactitude in 
Science” and “Pierre Menard, the Author of the Quixote”, where the exact reproduction, 
which is in the latter considered as ‘infinitely richer’, destructs the original (Collected 
Fictions 94). Toro states in his article “Borges/Foucault/Derrida”, that by repeating and 
reproducing the Don Quixote by Cervantes, the “original” text becomes absent because: ‘it 
has not been reanimated: not to be reanimated means that a dialogicity in the signified, from 
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yesterday and today, is not established because there is no mimesis in the sense of 
transformation or reactualization: Pierre Menard simulates it, that is, replaces it, obliterates it, 
commits parricide, does away with the origin’ (148). 
 As such Borges addresses the problem of absence, which is exemplary for post-
structuralist thinkers like Derrida, the absence of an origin or of a final signified. In his story 
“The Library of Babel”, books endlessly refer to each other, functioning as signifiers, without 
ever reaching that one book that would explain everything, that is, without reaching a final 
and fixed signified. As such this story illustrates Derrida’s play of différance, in which 
meaning, the signified is being constantly deferred. The signifiers no longer search for a 
signified, but instead only refer to other signifiers from which they differ. This is also the case 
in Borges’ imaginary classification of animals in a certain encyclopedia. What Borges 
presents here, in this classification, is the absence of a presence: the signifiers no longer 
search for signifieds, that is a presence, from which their meaning could be derived. He 
presents signs without referentiality to the world, that is without referentiality to a place where 
such meetings would be possible. The ‘signifieds err without meaning’, as Torres states in his 
article  “Postmodern and Postcolonial Discourse in Borges” (73).  
This absence could be the reason why Foucault states in The Order of Things, that 
Borges ‘shatters our thought’, that is our language. These signs, in this classification, as well 
as in the library, float without any purpose, and, as Foucault argues with regard to the Chinese 
encyclopedia, ‘lack all life and place’ which leads ‘to a kind of thought without space’ (The 
Order of Things xx). This classification is monstrous, according to Foucault, because Borges 
creates a ‘disorder in which fragments of a large number of possible orders glitter separately 
in the dimension, without law or geometry, of the heteroclite; and that word should be taken 
in its most literal, etymological sense: in such a state, things are “laid”, “placed”, “arranged” 
in sites so very different from one another that it is impossible to find a place of residence for 
them, to define a common locus beneath them all’ (xix). Borges shatters ‘our’ language, that 
is language as it is thought of in the modern age, because language in Borges’ short stories 
already contains the beginnings of new relations, like the unstable, infinite play of 
signification, which is exemplary for post-structuralism.  
In her article “Modernism/Postmodernism in ‘The Library of Babel’”, Keiser argues 
that Borges can be seen as a ‘transitional figure’ between modernism and postmodernism 
(39). What Borges shares with modernist thought, she argues, is ‘the longing for unity amidst 
plurality’ (40). The narrator of “The Library of Babel” says, with regard to this to this total 
book that would explain everything, for example: ‘Let heaven exist, though my own place be 
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in hell. Let me be tortured and battered and annihilated, but let there be one instant, one 
creature, wherein thy enormous Library may find its justification’ (Collected Fictions 117). 
But unlike modernists, Borges questions in “The Library of Babel”, Keiser states, ‘the 
concept of a total signifier constituted by an ideal, preexisting, independent signified’, just 
like Derrida in Of Grammatology (Keiser 41). But Borges, Keiser states, ‘only hints at its 
absence, rather than proclaiming its nonexistence’, like Derrida does (41). Borges’ fiction, 
Keiser states, ‘resembles a borderland’ between modernism and postmodernism (45).  
 
2.6  Conclusion chapter 2 
At the end of The Order of Things, published in 1966, Foucault announces a third rupture in 
the Western episteme. He announces the possibility of a whole new form of thought, due to 
the over-determination of questions on the subject of language. In this whole new 
configuration of knowledge, language regains its lost unity and takes place once more within 
a single space. I argued that this new episteme could be called the post-modern episteme and 
that Derrida’s Of Grammatology, published in 1967, and his text “Différance”, published in 
1972, could be an example of this new form of thought which is incompatible with modern 
thought, in which structuralism played a fundamental role.  
Borges’ stories “Funes, His Memory”, “Pierre Menard, Author of the Quixote”, and 
“The Library of Babel”, were published in 1944, and “On Exactitude in Science” was first 
published in 1946. Chronologically seen, it could be possible that Borges takes, between the 
modern age and the new episteme, the same position as Cervantes and Sade occupied. As I 
have shown, Borges poses in his stories questions on the origin and meaning, which are 
similar to the questions Derrida asks years later. Borges intervenes with structuralism, which 
is fundamental for modern thought, and takes it to its ultimate limit, just like Sade did with 
classical thought, and Cervantes with Renaissance thought, by taking the notion of the sign 
and its arbitrary and differential character, and presenting in his stories signifiers that no 
longer search for signifieds. As such Borges’ stories already contain new relations between 
language and things, that are incompatible with structural linguistics, because the signified, 
the notion of the origin, and a final and fixed meaning are being put at stake. Borges’ 
literature can be seen as transitional, just like the literature of Cervantes and Sade’s literature 
was, and could as such take indeed the same position between the modern age and the new 
episteme, which, as I argued, is the postmodern age, as Sade occupied between the Classical 
age and the modern age, and Cervantes occupied between the Renaissance and the Classical 
age. 
38 
 
 Literature thus plays an important role in The Order of Things because the literature of 
Cervantes and Sade, and as I have argued also the literature of Borges, take a certain position 
between two epistemes, between two different systems of knowledge. But what does this 
position that literature apparently can take, mean for the status of literature in The Order of 
Things? Since Foucault gives these literary examples with regard to the discontinuities in the 
way in which order, the relation between language and things, is established, what does that 
mean for the role and function of literature? What is literature and what is it that literature can 
do in relation to positive knowledge?  
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Chapter 3: About heterotopias and the status of literature 
 
So far, I have discussed the fact that Foucault states that the literature of Cervantes and Sade 
take a certain position between two epistemes. They occupy a position between two 
epistemes, between two different systems of knowledge, because they take the relation 
between language and things as it was thought of to its ultimate limit, and already contain the 
beginnings of new relations as it will be thought of in the next episteme. As such their 
literature can be seen as transitional. Because Foucault announces a third discontinuity and 
discusses Borges extensively in the preface, I examined in the previous chapter if Borges 
could take a similar position between the modern age and the new episteme, as Cervantes 
occupied between the Renaissance and the Classical age, and Sade occupied between the 
Classical age and the modern age. I argued that this could indeed be said, because Borges 
takes structural linguistics to its ultimate limit, just like Cervantes did with thinking in 
resemblances, and Sade did with representation, and language in Borges’ short stories, already 
contains the beginnings of new relations.  
But why does Foucault ascribe such a special place to literature? Why does he give 
these literary examples in a philosophical text that addresses itself to the general space of 
knowledge and its configurations? By giving these literary examples in relation to the 
discontinuities  in the Western episteme, Foucault seems to imply that there is something that 
literature can do in relation to positive knowledge. What is the status of literature? What could 
the role and function of literature be with regard to these discontinuities? My hypothesis is 
that the answer may be found in Foucault’s notion of heterotopias, which are outside-places 
but are, as opposed to utopias which are always unreal, nevertheless real spaces. The answer 
may be found in Foucault’s notion of heterotopias, because Foucault states that a 
discontinuity, which forms a radical break with the previous way of thinking things ‘probably 
begins with an erosion from outside, from that space which is, for thought, on the other side’ 
(The Order of Things 56). Can literature be seen as a heterotopia? If so, could Foucault then 
imply that a discontinuity starts in literature? 
 
3.1  Foucault’s descriptions of heterotopias  
Foucault mentions heterotopias only two times, first in the preface of The Order of Things and  
in 1967 he gave a lecture about heterotopias, which formed the basis of the text “Different 
Spaces”. In both texts Foucault opposes heterotopias to utopias; whereas utopias are always 
unreal and imaginary, heterotopias are always real. But the description of what heterotopias 
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are and what they do, differs from each other in these two texts, which makes the definition of 
the term problematic. Whereas in the preface of The Order of Things, Foucault writes about 
heterotopias in relation to Borges’ classification in the Chinese encyclopedia, and heterotopias 
seem to have something to do with order and language, in “Different Spaces” heterotopias are 
physical spaces.  
In the text “Different Spaces”, Foucault states that he is interested in spaces that ‘have 
the curious property of being connected to all the other emplacements, but in such a way that 
they suspend, neutralize, or reverse the set of relations that are designated, reflected, or 
represented by them’ (Aesthetics, Method and Epistemology 178). These spaces, which are 
linked with all the other spaces, but contradict them or are at variance with them, are, 
Foucault states, ‘of two great types’ (178). These two types of spaces are utopias and 
heterotopias. Utopias, Foucault states, are emplacements that have ‘no real place. They are 
emplacements that maintain a general relation of direct or inverse analogy with the real space 
of society. They are society perfected or the reverse of society, but in any case these utopias 
are spaces that are fundamentally and essentially unreal’ (178). As opposed to utopias, which 
are unreal places, heterotopias are real, actual and localizable places, but are ‘utterly different 
from all the emplacements that they reflect or refer to’ (178). Heterotopias, Foucault states, 
are places ‘that are designed into the very institution of society, which are sorts of actually 
realized utopias in which the real emplacements, all the other real emplacements that can be 
found within the culture are, at the same time, represented, contested, and reversed’ (178). 
They are places that do exist but are ‘sorts of places that are outside all places, although they 
are actually localizable’ (178). As such, heterotopias are ‘different spaces, other places’; 
places that are, Foucault states, ‘a kind of contestation, both mythical and real, of the space in 
which we live’ (179).  
 Foucault gives six principles of heterotopias, in order to describe and explain what 
they are exactly. The first principle is that heterotopias are universal: there is, Foucault states, 
‘probably not a single culture in the world that does not establish heterotopias’ (179). These 
heterotopias are of two major types. First there are ‘crisis heterotopias’, which can be found in 
primitive societies, and are ‘privileged or sacred or forbidden places reserved for individuals’, 
like women in labor, menstruating women, etc, ‘who are in a state of crisis with respect to 
society’ (179). In our society, Foucault states, these heterotopias of crisis have disappeared 
and are being replaced by ‘heterotopias of deviation’, which are places ‘in which individuals 
are put whose behavior is deviant with respect to the mean or the required form’, such as 
prisons and psychiatric hospitals (180). The second principle is that the function or use of a 
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certain heterotopia can be refashioned over time. A society, Foucault states, ‘can make a 
heterotopia that exists and has not ceased to exist operate in a very different way’ (180). 
Foucault gives the cemetery as an example. The third principle is that the heterotopia ‘has the 
ability to juxtapose in a single real place several emplacements that are incompatible in 
themselves’ (181). The garden and the carpet, which was, Foucault argues, originally a 
reproduction of the garden, are examples of such a heterotopia in which several, incompatible, 
emplacements are juxtaposed.  The garden, Foucault states, ‘is a carpet in which the entire 
world attains its symbolic perfection, and the carpet is a kind of garden that moves through 
space. The garden is the smallest parcel of the world and the whole world at the same time’ 
(182).  
The fourth principle is that heterotopias are connected with time. First there are 
heterotopias that accumulate time indefinitely, like libraries and museums (182). Opposite to 
these heterotopias, Foucault states, there are heterotopias that are linked ‘to time in its most 
futile, most transitory and precarious aspect, and in the form of the festival’ (182). They are 
absolutely temporal, instead of being oriented towards the eternal like the first. The fifth 
principle is that heterotopias ‘always presuppose a system of opening and closing that isolates 
them and makes them penetrable at the same time’ (183). And the sixth and last principle is 
that heterotopias ‘have a function in relation to the remaining space’ (184). This function, 
Foucault states, ‘is spread between two extreme poles’ (184). Either, heterotopias, Foucault 
argues, have the role ‘of creating a space of illusion that denounces all real space, all real 
emplacements within which human life is partitioned off, as being even more illusory’ (184). 
Foucault gives brothels as an example of such a heterotopia of illusion. Or, heterotopias have 
the role of ‘creating a different space, a different real space as perfect, as meticulous, as well-
arranged as ours is disorganized, badly arranged, and muddled’ (184). It could be that 
colonies, Foucault states, functioned in this way, not as heterotopias of illusion, but of 
compensation (184).  
Thus, as Foucault describes them in “Different Spaces”, heterotopias are real, physical 
spaces. They contest or reverse all the other places to which they refer or reflect, which makes 
them different or other. But this description of heterotopias differs from how heterotopias are 
described in the preface of The Order of Things. Although Foucault also opposes heterotopias 
to utopias, these notions are here applied to language instead of to space. He writes that 
although utopias ‘have no real locality there is nevertheless a fantastic, untroubled region in 
which they are able to unfold; they open up cities with vast avenues, superbly planted 
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gardens, countries where life is easy, even though the road to them is chimerical’ (The Order 
of Things xix). Whereas utopias ‘afford consolation’, Foucault states, heterotopias are:  
 
disturbing, probably because they secretly undermine language, because they 
make it impossible to name this and that, because they shatter or tangle 
common names, because they destroy “syntax” in advance, and not only the 
syntax with which we construct sentences but also that less apparent syntax 
which causes words and things (next to and also opposite one another) to 
“hold together”. 
(xix) 
 
Whereas, Foucault states, ‘utopias permit fables and discourse: [because] they run with the 
very grain of language and are part of the fundamental dimension of the fabula; heterotopias 
(such as those to be found so often in Borges) desiccate speech, stop words in their tracks, 
contest the very possibility of grammar at its source; they dissolve our myths and sterilize the 
lyricism of our sentences’ (xix).  
There seems to be a tension between the only two texts in which Foucault mentions 
heterotopias, because the notion of heterotopias in “Different Spaces” is applied to physical 
places, while it is in the preface of The Order of Things applied to language. What both texts 
have in common, is the opposition of utopias and heterotopias, and in both texts heterotopias 
have the property of being a kind of contestation. But whereas in “Different Spaces” 
heterotopias are places that contest the space in which we live, in The Order of Things 
heterotopias contest language. Do these two texts contradict each other? Or is it possible to 
make a connection between them? And why are heterotopias so often found in Borges? 
 
3.2  Literature as heterotopia 
In what sense are heterotopias so often found in Borges’ literature? Is it in the sense of  
physical spaces? Does Foucault mean heterotopic spaces as he describes them in his text 
“Different Spaces”, of which the library was an example? Borges’ short story “The Library of 
Babel”, which I have analyzed in the previous chapter, takes place in a library. But the library, 
as example of an heterotopic place, does not explain why Foucault in The Order of Things, 
with regard to Borges’ classification of a Chinese encyclopedia, states that heterotopias 
undermine language, desiccate speech, shatter common names, and destroy the syntax which 
causes words and things to hold together, and that such heterotopias are so often found in 
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Borges’ literature. As such, I do not think that Foucault means that heterotopias in the sense 
of physical spaces, of which the library is an example, are often found in Borges’ literature.   
‘The uneasiness that makes us laugh when we read Borges’, Foucault states, ‘is 
certainly related to the profound distress of those whose language has been destroyed: loss of 
what is “common” to place and name’ (xx). According to Foucault’s description of what 
heterotopias do in The Order of Things, heterotopias undermine language because they shatter 
common names and destroy the syntax which causes words and things to hold together. That 
is exactly what happens in Borges’ short stories. In the previous chapter I argued that the 
reason why Foucault states that Borges’ classification of a Chinese encyclopedia shatters ‘our 
thought’, that is, the thought of the modern age, is because this classification already contains 
new relations between language and things, like the infinite play of signification, the play of 
différance. I argued that Borges intervenes with structuralism, which is fundamental for 
modern thought, and takes it to ultimate limit, by presenting signifiers that no longer search 
for signifieds. That is why, I argued, Foucault states that Borges disturbs and threatens ‘with 
collapse our age-old distinction between the Same and the Other’ (xvi). Language as it is 
thought of in the modern age is being undermined. I think Foucault states that heterotopias are 
often found in Borges, because Borges’ short stories threaten and disturb the way in which the 
relations between things and language, the way in which things are ordered, as it is thought of 
in the modern age. These stories contest, which is what heterotopias do according to Foucault 
in “Different Spaces”, the space in which we live; the modern age. But if that is the reason 
why heterotopias are often found in Borges stories, because modern language is being 
contested and undermined, are heterotopias then not also found in Sade and Cervantes? Are 
heterotopias not also found in Sade’s Justine and Juliette, and in Cervantes’ Don Quixote  
because they, just like Borges with regard to the modern age, contest and undermine language 
as it was thought in their age? 
What Borges, Sade and Cervantes have in common, as I have argued in the previous 
chapter, is that all three of them can be seen as transitional figures between two epistemes. 
What they have in common is that they all three, in their literature, take the previous way of 
thinking things, of ordering things, the way in which things and language are related, to its 
ultimate limit and already contain the beginnings of new relations as they will be thought of in 
the next episteme. They all three contest the old way of ordering things; Cervantes takes 
thinking in resemblances to its ultimate limit by presenting uncontrolled similitudes, Sade 
takes thinking in representations to its ultimate limit by presenting ceaselessly, rigid 
sequences of scenes in which every desire has to be named, and Borges takes structuralism to 
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its ultimate limit by presenting uncontrolled signifiers that no longer search for signifieds. In 
doing that they also reverse the old way of ordering things, by presenting uncontrolled 
resemblances, language already functions as representation, by presenting uncontrolled 
representations, language already emerges as a brute thing, as a being proper to itself, and by 
presenting uncontrolled signifiers, language already functions as the play of différance. By 
contesting and reversing the old way of thinking and ordering things, they all three, 
undermine, disturb and destroy language as it was thought of before. As such, I think you 
could say that heterotopias are found in the literature of not only Borges, but also in Sade and 
Cervantes.  
In his article “Foucault, Borges, Heterotopia: Producing Knowledge in Other Spaces”, 
Topinka argues that ‘heterotopias are sites in which epistemes collide and overlap’ (55). By 
juxtaposing and combining many spaces in one site, Topinka states, ‘heterotopias 
problematize received knowledge by revealing and destabilizing the ground, or operating 
table, on which knowledge is built’ (56). This is what happens in the literature of Cervantes, 
Sade and Borges. By taking on the one hand the old way of thinking to its ultimate limit, and 
on the other hand already containing the beginnings of new relationships, Cervantes, Sade and 
Borges, all three juxtapose two ways of thinking things, of ordering things. They juxtapose 
within  a single work, the old table upon which language intersects space, and a new table 
upon which language will intersect space, while these different tables are in themselves 
incompatible. As such, the third principle of heterotopias, which was that they have ‘the 
ability to juxtapose in a single real place several emplacements that are in themselves 
incompatible’, can be applied to the literature of Cervantes, Sade and Borges (Aesthetics 181).  
 Not only the third principle, but also the sixth principle can be applied to the literature 
of Cervantes, Sade and Borges. Heterotopias, Topinka argues, are ‘sites of reordering’ (56) 
According to the sixth principle, heterotopias either create ‘a space of illusion that denounces 
all real space […] as being even more illusory’, or they create ‘a different real space as 
perfect, as meticulous, as well-arranged as ours is disorganized, badly arranged, and muddled’ 
(Aesthetics 184). The literary works of Cervantes, Sade and Borges, do not, I think, create a 
space of illusion, although these works are fictions, that denounce all other spaces as even 
more illusory, rather, they create within these works a different space, by taking the old of 
way of ordering things to its limit and already containing new relationships between language 
and things. In doing that these works show that the old table, the old way of ordering things is 
muddled and disorganized.  
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 While there seems to be a tension between “Different Spaces”, in which heterotopias 
are physical spaces, and The Order of Things, in which heterotopias are related to language, 
these texts do not necessarily contradict each other. When Foucault states in The Order of 
Things that heterotopias are disturbing because they undermine language, and that such 
heterotopias are found in Borges’ literature, I argued, it is because these short stories provide 
a different space of ordering, because they provide a different table upon which language 
intersects space. As such Borges’ stories contest and reverse the relation between language 
and things as it is thought of in the modern age. But this is what happens not only in the 
literature of Borges, but also in Cervantes’ Don Quixote with regard to the Renaissance and 
Sade’s  Justine and Juliette with regard to the Classical age. These works of all three writers, 
which Foucault discusses, can be seen as heterotopias. But since he discusses these works 
with regard to the discontinuities that can be seen in the Western episteme, what could the 
function of literature be in relation to these discontinuities?  Such a discontinuity, which 
forms a radical break with the previous way of thinking things, Foucault states,  ‘probably 
begins with an erosion from outside, from that space which is, for thought, on the other side, 
but in which it has never ceased to think from the very beginning’ (56). Isn’t such an outside 
place exactly what the description of a heterotopia is, according to Foucault in “Different 
Spaces”? If literature can be seen as a heterotopia, what does that mean for the role and 
function of literature in relation to a discontinuity? 
 
3.3  The status of literature 
What is the status of literature? And what is the relation between literature and knowledge? 
Before his book The Order of Things, Foucault has written two essays about literature, called 
“Language to Infinity” and “The Thought of the Outside”. In “Language to Infinity”  Foucault 
addresses the being of literary language. In this text Foucault states that ‘one of the most 
decisive ontological events of language’ is ‘its mirrored reflection upon death and the 
construction, from this reflection, of a virtual space where speech discovers the endless 
resourcefulness of its own image, and where it can represent itself as already existing behind 
itself, already active beyond itself, to infinity. The possibility of a work of language finds its 
original fold in this duplication’ (Aesthetics 90-91). A work of language, in which language 
reflects and duplicates itself, Foucault states, is:  
 
the body of language crossed by death in order to open this infinite space 
where doubles reverberate. And the forms of this superimposition, essential to 
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the construction of any work, can undoubtedly only be deciphered in these 
adjacent, fragile, and slightly monstrous figures where a division into two 
signals itself; their exact listing and classification, the establishment of the 
laws that govern their functioning or transformations, could well lead to a 
formal ontology of literature.  
(93) 
 
In a work of language, language is taken to infinity. It seeks its own limits, by exhausting its 
own possibilities. 
 The literature of Sade, is, Foucault states, an example of such a work of language in 
which language is taken to infinity. ‘Through so many bodies consummated in their actual 
existence’, Foucault argues, this language ‘devours all eventual words, all those words which 
have yet to be born […] Each scene in its visible aspect is doubled by a demonstration that 
repeats it and gives it value as a universal element’ (96). What is being consumed in his 
literature, Foucault states, is ‘not all future languages but every language that has been 
effectively pronounced: everything, before Sade and in his time, that could have been thought, 
said, practiced, desired, honored, flouted, or condemned in relation to man, God, the soul, the 
body, sex, nature, priests, or women finds itself meticulously repeated’ (96). Everything is 
being ‘repeated, combined, dissociated, reversed, and reversed once again, not in view of a 
dialectical reward but toward a radical exhaustion’ (96). Sade’s ‘impossible book’, Foucault 
states, ‘stands in the place of every book’, because it contains everything that could have 
possibly been said at his time (96). Under the obvious pastiche, Foucault states, ‘of all the 
philosophies and stories of the eighteenth century, beneath this immense double that is not 
without analogy to Don Quixote, the totality of language finds itself sterilized by the single 
and identical movement of two inseparable figures: the strict, inverted repetition of what has 
already been said and the simple naming of that which lies at the limit of what we can say’ 
(96). Thus, just as in The Order of Things, Foucault mentions the works of Cervantes and 
Sade in which language as it is thought of is taken to its limit. 
 In another essay, “The Thought of the Outside”, Foucault asks the question of what 
literature is. Literature, Foucault states in this text is ‘not language approaching itself until it 
reaches the point of its fiery manifestation; it is, rather, language getting as far away from 
itself as possible’ (Aesthetics 149). In this ‘setting “outside of itself”’, Foucault states, 
language ‘unveils its own being’ (149). We are now standing, Foucault states, ‘on the edge of 
an abyss that had long been invisible: the being of language only appears for itself with the 
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disappearance of the subject’ (149). As I have shown in the second chapter, this is why 
Foucault announces in The Order of Things a third rupture in the Western episteme, why he 
announces the possibility of a new form of thought, in which language regains its unity with 
at its cost the disappearance of the subject. In “The Thought of the Outside”, Foucault states, 
that perhaps we can gain access to this strange relation between the being of language and the 
disappearance of the subject through:  
 
a thought that stands outside subjectivity, setting its limit as though from 
without, articulating its end, making its dispersion shine forth, taking in only 
its invincible absence; and that, at the same time, stands at the threshold of all 
positivity, not in order to grasp its foundation or justification but in order to 
regain the space of its unfolding, the void serving as its site, the distance in 
which it is constituted and into which its immediate certainties slip the 
moment they are glimpsed – a thought that, in relation to the interiority of our 
philosophical reflection and the positivity of our knowledge, constitutes what 
in a phrase we might call “the thought of the outside”. 
(150)  
 
The thought of the outside thus stands, in relation to philosophical reflection and positive 
knowledge, on the threshold of all positivity. 
In The Order of Things, Foucault states that between the ‘already “encoded” eye’, 
which are the fundamental codes of a culture which ‘establish for every man, from the very 
first, the empirical orders with which he will be dealing and within which he will be at home’, 
and reflexive knowledge, which ‘are scientific theories or the philosophical interpretations 
which explain why order exists in general, what universal law it obeys, what principle can 
account for it, and why this particular order has been established and not some other’, 
Foucault states, lies a middle region (xxii). It is in this domain, Foucault states, ‘that a culture, 
imperceptibly deviating from the empirical orders prescribed for it by its primary codes, 
instituting an initial separation from them, causes them to lose their original transparency, 
relinquishes its immediate and invisible powers, frees itself sufficiently to discover that these 
orders are perhaps not the only possible ones or the best ones’ (xxii). This middle region 
‘liberates order itself’ (xxii). Between the two extremities of thought, Foucault states, between 
‘the use of what one might call the ordering codes and reflections upon order itself, there is 
the pure experience of order and its modes of being’ (xxiii).  
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I think you could say that literature can be located in this middle region. In “The 
Thought of the Outside”, Foucault states that the language of fiction can be a power that 
undoes images, ‘that lessens their overload, that infuses them with an inner transparency that 
illuminates them little by little until they burst and scatter in the lightness of the 
unimaginable’ (153). The fictitious, Foucault states, ‘is never in things or in people but in the 
impossible verisimilitude of what lies between them – encounters, the proximity of what is 
most distant, the absolute dissimulation in our very midst. Therefore, fiction consists not in 
showing the invisible, but in showing the extent to which the invisibility of the visible is 
invisible’ (153). From the moment, Foucault states, that discourse starts ‘addressing the very 
being of language, [it] returns thought to the outside’, which is thus a thought that stands, in 
relation to philosophical reflection and positive knowledge, on the threshold of all positivity 
(154). And from that moment, Foucault continues, it becomes in a single stroke ‘a meticulous 
narration of experiences, encounters, and improbable signs – language about the outside of all 
language, speech about the invisible side of words’ (154). Then it ‘becomes attentiveness to 
what in language already exists, has already been said, imprinted, manifested – a listening less 
to what is articulated in language than to the void circulating between its words, to the 
murmur that is forever taking it apart; a discourse on the nondiscourse of all language; the 
fiction of the invisible space in which it appears’ (154). The thought of the outside is the 
radical exhaustion of language, of all that can potentially be said, it is language as it is thought 
of taken to infinity. 
As I have said, Foucault states in “Language to Infinity”, that the works of Sade are an 
example of a work of language in which language is taken to infinity. These works, Foucault 
states: 
 
inhabit a strange limit, which they nevertheless persist in transgressing – or, 
rather, which they transgress because of the fact that they speak: they deny 
themselves the space of their language – but by confiscating it in a gesture of 
repetitive appropriation; and they evade not only their meaning (a meaning 
constructed at every turn) but their possible being; the indecipherable play of 
ambiguity within them is nothing but the serious sign of this conflict which 
forces them to be the double of every language (which, in their repetition,  
they set to fire) and of their own absence (which they constantly manifest).  
(Aesthetics 96-97) 
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In The Order of Things, Foucault states that Sade’s Juliette is the ‘last language’ that 
‘undertakes to “represent”, to name’, but simultaneously ‘reduces this ceremony to the utmost 
precision (it calls things by their exact name, thus eliminating the space occupied by rhetoric) 
and extends it to infinity (by naming everything, including the slightest of possibilities)’ 
(229). By taking language thought of as representation to infinity, Sade’s works deny the 
space of their language, they eliminate the space occupied by rhetoric. As such, they present a 
language that sets outside of itself, a language that transgresses its limit, because they already, 
by taking language to its ultimate limit, contain the beginnings of new relations between 
language and things. Seen as such, the thought of the outside, which is reached when 
language is taken to infinity, could be the thought of the next episteme. By taking language 
thought of as representation to infinity, and as such eliminating the space occupied by 
rhetoric, Sade’s works inaugurate the relation between language and things as it will be 
thought of in the modern age, in which language is no longer thought of as representation.  
 Whereas Sade’s works inhabit the limit of language thought of as representation, 
Foucault states in “Language to Infinity” that Borges’ story “The Library of Babel” inhabits a 
new limit. In this story, Foucault states:  
 
everything that can possibly be said has already been said: it contains all 
conceived and imagined languages, and even those which might be conceived 
or imagined; everything has been pronounced, even those things without 
meaning, so that the odds of discovering even the smallest formal coherence 
are extremely slight, as witnessed by the persevering search of those who 
have never been granted this dispensation. And yet standing above all these 
words is the rigorous and sovereign language that recovers them, tells their 
story, and is actually responsible for their birth: a language that is itself 
poised against death, because it is at the moment of falling into the shaft of an 
infinite Hexagon that the most lucid (and consequently the last) of the 
librarians reveals that even the infinity of language multiplies itself to 
infinity, repeating itself without end in the divided structures of the Same. 
  (99-100) 
 
The space of language is nowadays defined, Foucault states, by Borges’ Library; ‘the ranging 
to infinity of fragmentary languages, substituting for the double chain of Rhetoric the simple, 
continuous, and monotonous line of language left to its own devices, a language fated to be 
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infinite because it can no longer support itself upon the speech of infinity’ (100). But within 
itself, Foucault continues, language ‘finds the possibility of its own division, of its own 
repetition, the power to create a vertical system of mirrors, self images, analogies. A language 
that repeats no other speech, no other promise, but postpones death indefinitely by ceaselessly 
opening a space where it is always the analogue of itself’ (100). 
 What is taken to infinity, according to Foucault, in Borges’ story, is thus the infinity of 
fragmentary languages, which was exemplary for modern thought. Like Sade’s works, what is 
being consumed in Borges’ story is all that can possibly said. But because it is impossible to 
find that one book that contains everything, this story already illustrates the infinite play of 
signification and the absence of a final signified and origin. Literature, nowadays, Foucault 
states, begins ‘when the book is no longer the space where speech adopts a form (forms of 
style, forms of rhetoric, forms of language) but the site where books are all recaptured and 
consumed: a site that is nowhere, since it gathers all the books of the past in this impossible 
“volume” whose murmuring will be shelved among so many others – after all the others, 
before all the others’ (100-101).  
 Cervantes, Sade and Borges are examples of writers of a work of language, in which 
language as it is thought of is taken to infinity, in which language seeks its limits by radically 
exhausting its own possibilities. Such works of language, Foucault states, ‘continue without 
interruption, in a murmuring that has no other ontological status than that of a similar conflict’ 
(97). Thus, works of language have no other status than that of a conflict, or in other words 
contestation. This is also the status of heterotopias; works of language have a heterotopic 
status. By taking language as it is thought of to infinity, by radically exhausting all of its 
possibilities, works of language present a language sets outside of itself, a language that 
transgresses its own limits, presenting monstrous figures, reaching that which is 
unimaginable, unthinkable, unspeakable. As such language, which is taken to infinity denies 
its own space, it turns thought to the outside, and inaugurates the thought of the next episteme, 
because it already contains the beginnings of new relations between language and things.  
When language is taken to infinity, to its limit, and ‘arrives at its own edge’, Foucault 
states in “Thought of the Outside”, ‘what it finds is not a positivity that contradicts it but the 
void that will efface it’ (152). What it finds is ‘not reflection, but forgetting; not contradiction, 
but a contestation that effaces; not reconciliation, but droning on and on; not mind in 
laborious conquest of its unity, but the endless erosion of the outside, not truth finally 
shedding light on itself, but the streaming and distress of language that has always already 
begun’ (152). Thus, when Foucault states in The Order of Things that a discontinuity ‘begins 
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with an erosion from outside, from that space which is, for thought, on the other side, but in 
which it has never ceased to think from the beginning’, he could mean that it begins in 
literature, or more specifically in a work of language, which has a heterotopic status. 
 
3.4  Conclusion chapter 3 
Cervantes, Sade and Borges are writers of a work of language, according to Foucault in his 
text “Language to Infinity”, written before The Order of Things. In such a work of language, 
language as it is thought of is taken to infinity, it is taken to its limit. Cervantes takes 
Renaissance language, thinking in resemblances to infinity, Sade takes Classical language, 
language as representation to infinity, and Borges takes modern language, language that 
became fragmented, to infinity. They all three radically exhaust language, by repeating 
everything that  could have potentially been said at their time. The language of fiction, 
Foucault argues in “The Thought of the Outside”, can be a power that undoes images. As 
such, literature can be located in a domain which lies between philosophical reflection and 
positive knowledge, a domain which liberates order and relinquishes its invisible powers. In a 
work of language in which language is taken to infinity, language sets outside of itself, it 
transgresses its own limits. It turns thought to the outside, which is a thought that stands, in 
relation to philosophical reflection and positive knowledge, on the threshold of all positivity. 
By taking language to infinity and radically exhausting all of its possibilities, a work of 
language eliminates the space of its own language, and in presenting a language that sets 
outside of itself, language already contains the beginnings of new relations. As such, works of 
language have the status of conflict or contestation.  
These works of language by Cervantes, Sade and Borges, have the status of 
contestation. These works have a heterotopic status. They all three contest language as it is 
thought of at their time. As such, these works are heterotopias, which are outside spaces that 
contest the space of language as it is thought of. Fiction, Foucault states in “The Thought of 
the Outside”, ‘bears a profound relation to space; understood in this way, space is to fiction 
what the negative is to reflection’ (153). Heterotopias are outside spaces that undermine, 
disturb and destroy language, they contest and reverse language as it is thought of by taking 
language to its ultimate limit, by taking language to infinity. Heterotopias, which are works of 
language, destabilize the ground, or operating table, that is the table upon which language 
intersects space, upon which knowledge is built. They destabilize the ground upon which 
knowledge is built, by taking language to infinity, and as such presenting a language that sets 
outside of itself, already containing the beginnings of new relations. As such literature, or 
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more specifically works of language, which have a heterotopic status, can liberate order, by 
relinquishing its invisible powers, and can inaugurate the thought of the next episteme. 
Literature can turn thought to the outside by taking language to infinity, to its ultimate limit, 
causing an endless erosion of the outside, because language then transgresses its own limits, 
already containing beginnings of new relations. As such literature can inaugurate a new form 
of thought, which forms a radical break with the previous way of thinking things. Thus, such a 
discontinuity, which begins, as Foucault states, from an erosion from outside, can begin, can 
be inaugurated in heterotopic literature. 
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Coda 
 
This thesis was about the strange epistemological status of literature in Foucault’s earlier 
work, The Order of Things. Important questions of my thesis were: what is literature and what 
is it that literature can do in relation to positive knowledge? In “Distance, Aspect, Origin”, 
Foucault devoted a long, beautiful passage on the word fiction, which explains once more in 
other words, what fiction is and what it can do:  
 
What if the fictive was precisely not the beyond nor the intimate secret of the 
everyday, but the flight of the arrow which hits us right in the eyes and offers 
us everything which appears. In that case the fictive would be also that which 
names things, makes them speak and gives them in language their being 
already split by the sovereign power of words […] This is not to say, then, 
that fiction is language: this trick would be too simple, despite its familiarity. 
It is rather to say with more prudence that between them there is a complex 
adherence, a dependence and a contestation, and that, maintained for as long 
as it can keep its word, the simple experience which consists in taking up a 
pen and writing, disengages (in the sense of liberates, un-buries) a distance 
which belongs not to the world nor to the unconscious, nor to the gaze, nor to 
interiority: a distance which, in its naked state offers a grid of lines of ink and 
at the same time a labyrinth […] And if I was asked in the end to define 
fiction I would say, without skill: the verbal nervure of what does not exist, as 
it is.  
I would efface, in order to leave this experience to what it is (in order 
to threat it, therefore, as a fiction, since it does not exist, that we know), I 
would efface all the oppositions by which it might be easily dialecticized: 
confrontation or abolition of the subjective and the objective, of the interior 
and the exterior, reality and imaginary. This whole vocabulary of dualism, 
needs to be replaced by one of distance, thus allowing the fictive to appear as 
a distancing specific to language – a distancing which has its place within it, 
but which, at the same time stretches out, disperses it, divides it up and opens 
it. Fiction does not arise because language is at a distance from things; 
language is their distance, the light in which they appear and their 
inaccessibility, the simulacra where only their presence is given; and any 
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language which rather than forget this distance maintains itself within it and 
maintains it within itself, is a language of fiction.   
(The Tel Quel Reader 103-104) 
 
Literature takes a privileged position in The Order of Things, because it can occupy a position 
between two epistemes. This might seem strange at first sight, but is maybe not that strange at 
all. Foucault is in this book concerned with how a culture establishes the table upon which 
language intersects space, how it experiences the relationships and order of things, and is as 
such primarily interested in how a culture establishes the relation between language and 
things. Order is at the same time the table of how the relationships of things is defined, which 
enables thought to operate upon the entities of the world, while it is also that which has no 
existence except in the grid created by language. The ground upon which knowledge is 
founded, thus depends on how a culture experiences the relation between language and things.  
And it is precisely this relation that changes sometimes. Foucault implies, I argued, that this 
change starts in literature. It starts in a work of language, which has a heterotopic status. 
Works of language take language to infinity, presenting a language that sets outside of itself, 
and as such eliminate the space of their language by contesting and reversing the relations of 
language and things. The power of the language of fiction is that it can destabilize the ground 
upon which knowledge is built, it can liberate order and relinquish its invisible powers. That 
is why literature takes a privileged position in The Order of Things because it can inaugurate a 
discontinuity, it can inaugurate the thought of the next episteme, it can inaugurate a new 
relationship between language and things.  
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